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Abstract	We	 analyse	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 level	 of	 the	 inflation	 target	 and	 the	 zero	lower	bound	(ZLB)	imposed	on	the	nominal	interest	rate	in	the	framework	of	a	behavioral	New-Keynesian	macroeconomic	model	in	which	agents,	experiencing	cognitive	 limitations,	 use	 adaptive	 learning	 forecasting	 rules.	 The	 model	produces	 endogenous	 waves	 of	 optimism	 and	 pessimism	 (animal	 spirits)	 that	lead	to	non-normal	distributions	of	the	output	gap.	We	find	that	when	the	inflation	target	is	too	close	to	zero,	the	economy	can	get	gripped	 by	 “chronic	 pessimism”	 that	 leads	 to	 a	 dominance	 of	 negative	 output	gaps	 and	 recessions,	 and	 in	 turn	 feeds	 back	 on	 expectations	 producing	 long	waves	 of	 pessimism.	 Low	 inflation	 targets	 create	 the	 risk	 of	 persistence	 of	recessions	and	low	growth.	 In	conclusion,	our	 framework	suggests	that	the	2%	inflation	target,	now	pursued	by	many	central	banks,	is	too	low.		
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1. Introduction		Due	to	the	presence	of	the	zero	lower	bound	(ZLB)	on	the	nominal	interest	rate,	an	 inflation	 target	 too	 close	 to	 zero	 risks	pushing	 the	economy	 into	a	negative	inflation	 territory	 even	 when	 mild	 shocks	 occur.	 Economists	 have	 identified	several	risks	associated	with	negative	inflation.	Two	of	these	have	received	much	attention	 in	 the	 economic	 literature.	 First,	 during	 periods	 of	 deflation	 the	nominal	interest	rate	is	likely	to	hit	the	lower	zero	bound.	When	this	happens	the	real	 interest	 rate	 cannot	 decline	 further.	 In	 fact	when	 deflation	 intensifies,	 the	real	 interest	 rate	 increases,	 further	 aggravating	 the	 deflationary	 dynamics.	 In	such	a	scenario	the	central	bank	loses	its	capacity	to	stimulate	the	economy	in	a	recession,	 thereby	 risking	 prolonged	 recessions	 (Eggertson	 and	Woodford(2003),	 Aruoba,	 &	 Schorfheide,	 F.	 (2013),	 Blanchard,	 et	 al.	 (2010),	Ball(2014)).		Second,	 deflation	 raises	 the	 real	 value	of	 debt	 leading	 to	 attempts	 of	 agents	 to	reduce	their	debt	by	saving	more.	This	adds	to	the	deflationary	dynamics.	 	This	debt	 deflation	 dynamics	was	 first	 described	 by	 Fisher(1933)	 and	 has	 received	renewed	 attention	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis	 of	 2007-08	 (see	 Koo(2011),	Eggertsson	and	Krugman(2012)).		In	this	paper	we	focus	on	the	first	risk.	Standard	linear	DSGE	models	have	tended	to	underestimate	the	probability	of	hitting	the	ZLB	as	was	shown	by	Chung,	et	al.,	(2012).	Most	 of	 these	models	 have	 led	 to	 the	prediction	 that	when	 the	 central	bank	keeps	 an	 inflation	 target	of	2%,	 it	 is	 very	unlikely	 for	 the	 economy	 to	be	pushed	 into	 the	 ZLB	 (Reifschneider	 and	 Williams	 (1999),	 Coenen(2003),	Schmitt-Grohe	and		Uribe(2007)	).		Building	 on	 a	 New	 Keynesian	 framework,	 we	 develop	 a	 behavioral	macroeconomic	model	to	shed	new	light	on	the	nature	of	this	risk.	This	model	is	characterized	by	the	fact	that	agents	experience	cognitive	limitations	preventing	them	 from	 having	 rational	 expectations.	 Instead	 they	 use	 simple	 forecasting	rules	 (heuristics)	 and	 evaluate	 the	 forecasting	 performances	 of	 these	 rules	 ex-post.	This	evaluation	leads	them	to	switch	to	the	rules	that	perform	best.	Thus,	it	
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can	 be	 said	 that	 agents	 use	 a	 trial-and-error	 learning	mechanism.	 This	 is	 also	called	“adaptive	learning”.	This	 adaptive	 learning	 model	 produces	 endogenous	 waves	 of	 optimism	 and	pessimism	(animal	 spirits)	 that	drive	 the	business	 cycle	 in	a	 self-fulfilling	way,	i.e.	 optimism	 (pessimism)	 leads	 to	 an	 increase	 (decline)	 in	 output,	 and	 the	increase	 (decline)	 in	 output	 in	 term	 intensifies	 optimism	 (pessimism),	 see	 De	Grauwe(2012),	and	De	Grauwe	and	Ji(2016).		An	important	feature	of	this	dynamics	of	animal	spirits	is	that	the	movements	of	the	 output	 gap	 are	 characterized	 by	 periods	 of	 tranquility	 alternating	 in	 an	unpredictable	way	with	periods	of	intense	movements	of	booms	and	busts.	More	technically,	the	dynamics	of	animal	spirits	leads	to	a	non-normal	distribution	of	the	output	gap	with	excess	kurtosis	and	 fat	 tails.	This	 is	a	model	 that	does	not	need	large	outside	shocks	to	generate	large	movements	in	output.	We	 use	 this	 behavioral	 model	 to	 analyze	 how	 the	 level	 of	 the	 inflation	 target	chosen	by	the	central	bank	affects	the	dynamics	created	by	animal	spirits	when	a	zero	 lower	 bound	 (ZLB)	 is	 imposed	 on	 the	 nominal	 interest	 rate.	 Our	 main	results	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	 follows.	 First,	 we	 find	 that	 when	 the	 inflation	target	is	too	close	to	zero,	the	economy	can	get	gripped	by	“chronic	pessimism”	that	 leads	 to	 a	 dominance	 of	 negative	 output	 gaps	 and	 recessions,	 and	 in	 turn	feeds	back	on	expectations	producing	long	waves	of	pessimism.	Using	parameter	calibrations	 that	are	generally	 found	 in	 the	 literature,	our	 results	 suggests	 that	an	 inflation	 target	 of	 2%,	which	 has	 become	 the	 standard	 followed	 by	 central	banks,	 is	 too	 low,	 i.e.	 it	 produces	 negative	 skewness	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	output	 gap.	We	 find	 that	 an	 inflation	 target	 in	 the	 range	 of	 3%	 to	 4%	 comes	closer	to	producing	a	symmetric	distribution	of	the	output	gap.		Second,	when	 comparing	 the	 results	 obtained	 from	our	behavioral	model	with	those	obtained	from	the	New	Keynesian	model	under	rational	expectations	(RE)	we	find	that	the	behavioral	model	produces	significantly	more	ZLB-hits	than	the	RE-model.	 In	 addition	when	 the	 interest	 rate	 is	 in	 the	 ZLB	 it	 remains	 stuck	 at	zero	much	longer	in	the	behavioral	than	in	the	RE-model.		
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Third,	we	find	that	when	the	economy	is	pushed	into	a	recession	as	a	result	of	a	negative	 demand	 shock,	 the	 high	 inflation	 target	 regime	 has	 better	 stabilizing	properties.	We	find	that	in	the	high	inflation	target	regime	the	persistence	of	the	recession	 is	 shorter	 than	 in	 the	 low	 inflation	 target	 regime.	 That	 is,	 when	 the	central	bank	sets	a	relatively	high	inflation	target,	the	capacity	of	the	system	to	lift	itself	out	of	the	recession	is	stronger	than	when	it	sets	a	low	inflation	target.	This	 is	made	possible	by	 the	stabilizing	properties	of	monetary	policies	and	by	the	ensuing	elimination	of	self-fulfilling	pessimism.	Fourth,	an	inflation	target	of	3%	to	4%	is	more	credible	than	an	inflation	target	of	2%.	The	reason	is	that	in	the	latter	case	the	economy	finds	itself	more	often	in	the	ZLB	 than	 in	 the	 former.	This	 reduces	 the	central	bank’s	 capacity	 to	control	inflation	and	output	gap.	The	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follows.	 Section	 2	 presents	 the	model	 and	 its	main	characteristics.	 Sections	 3	 to	 5	 present	 the	 results	 of	 this	 model.	 Section	 3	focuses	on	the	features	of	the	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	and	the	frequency	of	hitting	 ZLB	 under	 different	 inflation	 target	 regimes.	 To	 understand	 the	 role	 of	the	 animal	 spirits,	 we	 also	 compare	 the	 behavioral	 model	 with	 the	 rational	expectations	model.	 Section	4	discusses	 the	 impulse	 responses	 of	 the	different	endogenous	 variables	 to	 demand	 and	 supply	 shocks.	 Section	 5	 discusses	credibility	 issues	 resulting	 from	 increasing	 the	 inflation	 target.	 Section	 6	provides	some	empirical	validation	of	the	main	predictions	of	the	model.	Section	7	contains	the	conclusion.	
	
	
2.	The	behavioral	model		
2.1	Model	choice	Mainstream	 macroeconomics	 has	 been	 based	 on	 two	 fundamental	 ideas.	 The	first	one	is	that	macroeconomic	models	should	be	micro-founded,	i.e.	they	should	start	from	individual	optimization	and	then	aggregate	these	individuals’	optimal	plans	to	obtain	a	general	equilibrium	model.	This	procedure	leads	to	aggregation	problems	 that	 cannot	 easily	 be	 solved	 (Sonnenschein(1972),	 Kirman(1992)).	One	way	 to	 deal	with	 the	 aggregation	 problems	 is	 to	 assume	 a	 representative	
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agent,	 i.e.	 to	assume	that	demand	and	supply	decisions	 in	 the	aggregate	can	be	reduced	to	decisions	made	at	the	individual	level.		The	 second	 idea	 is	 that	 expectations	 are	 rational,	 i.e.	 take	 all	 available	information	 into	 account,	 including	 the	 information	 about	 the	 structure	 of	 the	economic	model	and	the	distribution	of	the	shocks	hitting	the	economy.		We	 make	 a	 different	 choice	 of	 model.	 First,	 we	 will	 bring	 at	 center	 stage	 the	heterogeneity	of	agents	in	that	they	have	different	beliefs	about	the	state	of	the	economy.	 As	 will	 be	 shown,	 it	 is	 the	 aggregation	 of	 these	 diverse	 beliefs	 that	creates	a	dynamics	of	booms	and	busts	in	an	endogenous	way.	The	price	we	pay	is	that	we	do	not	micro-found	the	model	and	assume	the	existence	of	aggregate	demand	 and	 supply	 equations.	 Second,	 we	 assume	 that	 agents	 have	 cognitive	limitations	preventing	them	from	having	rational	expectations.	Instead	they	will	be	 assumed	 to	 follow	 simple	 rules	 of	 thumb	 (heuristics).	 Rationality	 will	 be	introduced	 by	 assuming	 a	 willingness	 to	 learn	 from	mistakes	 and	 therefore	 a	willingness	 to	 switch	between	different	heuristics.	 In	making	 these	 choices	we	follow	the	road	taken	by	an	increasing	number	of	macroeconomists,	which	have	developed	 “agent-based	 models”	 and	 “behavioral	 macroeconomic	 models”	(Tesfatsion,	L.	(2001),	Colander,	et	al.	(2008),	Farmer	and	Foley(2009),	Gatti,	et	al.(2011),	 Westerhoff(2012),	 De	 Grauwe(2012),	 Hommes	 and	Lustenhouwer(2016)).	
	
2.2	Basic	model	The	 model	 consists	 of	 an	 aggregate	 demand	 equation,	 an	 aggregate	 supply	equation	and	a	Taylor	rule.		We	assume	the	existence	of	an	aggregate	demand	equation	in	the	following	way:	𝑦! = 𝑎!E!𝑦!!! + 1− 𝑎! 𝑦!!! + 𝑎! 𝑟! − E!𝜋!!! + 𝜀!																									(1)	where	yt	is	the	output	gap	in	period	t,	rt	is	the	nominal	interest	rate,	πt	is	the	rate	of	inflation,	and	εt	is	a	white	noise	disturbance	term.	The	tilde	above	E	refers	to	the	 fact	 that	 expectations	 are	 not	 formed	 rationally.	 How	 exactly	 these	expectations	are	formed	will	be	specified	subsequently.		
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We	follow	the	procedure	introduced	in	New	Keynesian	DSGE-models	of	adding	a	lagged	output	in	the	demand	equation.	This	can	be	justified	by	invoking	inertia	in	decision-making.	It	takes	time	for	agents	to	adjust	to	new	signals	because	there	is	habit	formation	or	because	of	institutional	constraints.	For	example,	contracts	cannot	be	renegotiated	instantaneously.		We	 assume	 an	 aggregate	 supply	 equation	 of	 the	 New	 Keynesian	 Philips	 curve	type	with	a	forward	looking	component,	E!𝜋!!!	,	and	a	lagged	inflation	variable1	:		𝜋! = 𝑏!E!𝜋!!! + 1− 𝑏! 𝜋!!! + 𝑏!𝑦! + 𝜂!																																																(2)		Finally	the	Taylor	rule	describes	the	behavior	of	the	central	bank		 	𝑟! = 𝑘! 𝜋∗ + 𝑘! 𝜋! − 𝜋∗ + 𝑘!𝑦! + (1− 𝑘!)𝑟!!! + 𝑢!																												(3)		where	 	is	 the	 inflation	 target;	 The	 central	 bank	 is	 assumed	 to	 smooth	 the	interest	rate.	This	smoothing	behavior	is	represented	by	adding	a	fraction	of	the	lagged	interest	rate	𝑟!!!	in	equation	(3).	For	simplicity	we	assume	that	the	long-term	equilibrium	interest	rate	is	zero	and	thus	it	does	not	appear	in	equation	(3).			
2.3	Normalizing	the	model	In	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 behavioral	 model	 following	 De	 Grauwe(2012),	 we	 first	normalize	the	model.	The	inflation	rates	and	interest	rates	can	be	expressed	as	deviations	from	the	inflation	target	𝜋∗.	To	be	specific,	we	define	these	deviations	as:	𝜋!! = 𝜋! − 𝜋∗,		𝑟!! = 𝑟! − 𝜋∗	and	𝑟!!!! = 𝑟!!! − 𝜋∗,		and		𝐸!𝜋!!!! = 𝐸!𝜋!!! − 𝜋∗.		Equations	(1)-(3)	can	be	normalized	as	follows:		𝑦! = 𝑎!E!𝑦!!! + 1− 𝑎! 𝑦!!! + 𝑎! 𝑟!! − E!𝜋!!!! + 𝜀!   																					(1a)	𝜋!! = 𝑏!E!𝜋!!!! + 1− 𝑏! 𝜋!!!! + 𝑏!𝑦! + 𝜂!																																														(2a)	𝑟!! = 𝑐!𝜋!! + 𝑐!𝑦! + 𝑐!𝑟!!!! + 𝑢!																																																																					(3a)	where	𝑐! = 𝑘!𝑘!,	𝑐! = 𝑘!𝑘!,	𝑐! = 1− 𝑘!.	
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2.4	Introducing	heuristics	in	forecasting	output	Agents	are	assumed	to	use	simple	rules	(heuristics)	to	forecast	the	future	output	E!𝑦!!!.	The	way	we	proceed	 is	 as	 follows.	We	assume	 two	 types	of	 forecasting	rules.	 A	 first	 rule	 is	 called	 a	 “fundamentalist”	 one.	 Agents	 estimate	 the	 steady	state	value	of	the	output	gap	(which	is	normalized	at	0)	and	use	this	to	forecast	the	future	output	gap2.	A	second	forecasting	rule	is	an	“extrapolative”	one.	This	is	a	 rule	 that	does	not	presuppose	 that	 agents	know	 the	 steady	 state	output	gap.	They	 are	 agnostic	 about	 it.	 Instead,	 they	 extrapolate	 the	 previous	 observed	output	gap	into	the	future.	The	two	rules	are	specified	as	follows:	The	fundamentalist	rule	is	defined	by		E!!y!!! = 0																																											(4)				The	extrapolative	rule	is	defined	by		E!!y!!! = 𝑦!!!																																								(5)	This	 kind	 of	 simple	 heuristic	 has	 often	 been	 used	 in	 the	 behavioral	 finance	literature	 where	 agents	 are	 assumed	 to	 use	 fundamentalist	 and	 chartist	 rules	(see	 Brock	 and	 Hommes(1997),	 Branch	 and	 Evans(2006),	 De	 Grauwe	 and	Grimaldi(2006)).	 It	 is	probably	the	simplest	possible	assumption	one	can	make	about	how	agents	who	experience	 cognitive	 limitations,	use	 rules	 that	 embody	limited	 knowledge	 to	 guide	 their	 behavior3.	 They	 only	 require	 agents	 to	 use	information	they	understand,	and	do	not	require	them	to	understand	the	whole	picture.		Thus	the	specification	of	the	heuristics	in	(4)	and	(5)	should	not	be	interpreted	as	a	realistic	representation	of	how	agents	forecast.	Rather	is	 it	a	parsimonious	representation	 of	 a	 world	 where	 agents	 do	 not	 know	 the	 “Truth”	 (i.e.	 the	underlying	model).	 The	use	 of	 simple	 rules	 does	 not	mean	 that	 the	 agents	 are	irrational	and	that	they	do	not	want	to	learn	from	their	errors.	We	will	specify	a	learning	mechanism	later	in	this	section	in	which	these	agents	continuously	try	to	correct	for	their	errors	by	switching	from	one	rule	to	the	other.		We	assume	 that	 the	market	 forecast	 can	be	obtained	as	 a	weighted	average	of	these	two	forecasts,	i.e.										E!𝑦!!! = 𝛼!,!E!!y!!! + 𝛼!,!E!!y!!!																									(6)	
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								E!𝑦!!! = 𝛼!,!0+ 𝛼!,!y!!!																																								(7)																						and								𝛼!,! + 𝛼!,! = 1																																																												(8)	where	 	and	 	are	 the	 probabilities	 that	 agents	 use	 a	 fundamentalist,	respectively,	an	extrapolative	rule.			In	 order	 to	 obtain	 some	 intuition	 about	 the	mechanics	 arising	 from	 the	 use	 of	these	two	rules	it	 is	useful	to	substitute	(7)	 into	equation	(1a).	 	 	 	Using	(8)	this	yields	 𝑦! = 1− 𝑎!𝛼!,! 𝑦!!! + 𝑎! 𝑟!! − E!𝜋!!!! + 𝜀!   	It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 when	𝛼!,! = 1,	 i.e.	 the	 probability	 of	 all	 agents	 using	 the	fundamentalist	rule	is	equal	to	1,	the	coefficient	in	front	of	𝑦!!!	is	1− 𝑎!,	while	if	𝛼!,! = 0, the	probability	 of	 all	 agents	 using	 the	 extrapolative	 rule	 is	 equal	 to	 1,	that	 coefficient	 is	 1.	 This	makes	 clear	 that	 the	 source	 of	 the	persistence	 in	 the	output	gap	will	be	coming	from	the	use	of	the	extrapolative	rule.		The	 forecasting	rules	 (heuristics)	 introduced	here	are	not	derived	at	 the	micro	level	and	then	aggregated.	Instead,	they	are	imposed	ex	post,	on	the	demand	and	supply	 equations.	 This	 has	 also	 been	 the	 approach	 in	 the	 learning	 literature	pioneered	by	Evans	and	Honkapohja(2001).	Ideally	one	would	like	to	derive	the	heuristics	 from	 the	micro-level	 in	 an	 environment	 in	which	 agents	 experience	cognitive	 problems.	 Our	 knowledge	 about	 how	 to	 model	 this	 behavior	 at	 the	micro	 level	and	how	to	aggregate	 it	 is	 too	sketchy,	however.	Psychologists	and	brain	 scientists	 struggle	 to	 understand	 how	 our	 brain	 processes	 information.	There	 is	as	yet	no	generally	accepted	model	we	could	use	 to	model	 the	micro-foundations	 of	 information	 processing	 in	 a	 world	 in	 which	 agents	 experience	cognitive	limitations.	We	have	not	tried	to	do	so4.			
	
2.5	Selecting	the	forecasting	rules	in	forecasting	output	As	 indicated	 earlier,	 agents	 in	 our	 model	 are	 willing	 to	 learn,	 i.e.	 they	continuously	evaluate	their	 forecast	performance.	This	willingness	to	 learn	and	to	 change	one’s	behavior	 is	 a	very	 fundamental	definition	of	 rational	behavior.	Thus	 our	 agents	 in	 the	model	 are	 rational,	 not	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 having	 rational	
tf ,α te,α
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expectations.	 Instead	our	 agents	 are	 rational	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 learn	 from	their	mistakes.	The	concept	of	“bounded	rationality”	is	often	used	to	characterize	this	behavior.		The	first	step	in	the	analysis	then	consists	in	defining	a	criterion	of	success.	This	will	 be	 the	 forecast	 performance	 (utility)	 of	 a	 particular	 rule.	 We	 define	 the	utility	of	using	the	fundamentalist	and	extrapolative	rules	as	follows:	𝑈!,! = − ω! y!!!!! − E!,!!!!!y!!!!! !!!!! 														(9)	 𝑈!,! = − ω! y!!!!! − E!,!!!!!y!!!!! !!!!! 												(10)	where	Uf,t	and	Ue,t		are	the	utilities	of	the	fundamentalist	and	extrapolating	rules,	respectively.	These	are	defined	as	the	negative	of	the	mean	squared	forecasting	errors	(MSFEs)	of	 the	forecasting	rules;	ωk	are	geometrically	declining	weights.	We	make	these	weights	declining	because	we	assume	that	agents	tend	to	forget.	Put	 differently,	 they	 give	 a	 lower	 weight	 to	 errors	 made	 far	 in	 the	 past	 as	compared	to	errors	made	recently.	The	degree	of	 forgetting	turns	out	to	play	a	major	role	in	our	model.	This	was	analyzed	in	De	Grauwe(2012).	The	 next	 step	 consists	 in	 evaluating	 these	 utilities.	 We	 apply	 discrete	 choice	theory	 (see	 Anderson,	 de	 Palma,	 and	 Thisse,	 (1992)	 and	 Brock	 &	Hommes(1997))	 in	 specifying	 the	 procedure	 agents	 follow	 in	 this	 evaluation	process.	If	agents	were	purely	rational	they	would	just	compare	Uf,t	and	Ue,t	in	(9)	and	(10)	and	choose	the	rule	that	produces	the	highest	value.	Thus	under	pure	rationality,	 agents	 would	 choose	 the	 fundamentalist	 rule	 if	Uf,t	 >	Ue,t,	 and	 vice	versa.	However,	psychologists	have	stressed	that	when	we	have	to	choose	among	alternatives	we	are	also	influenced	by	our	state	of	mind	(see	Kahneman(2002)).	The	latter	is	to	a	large	extent	unpredictable.	It	can	be	influenced	by	many	things,	the	weather,	recent	emotional	experiences,	etc.	One	way	to	formalize	this	is	that	the	utilities	of	the	two	alternatives	have	a	deterministic	component	(these	are	Uf,t	and	Ue,t	 in	(9)	and	(10))	and	a	random	component	εf,t	and	εe,t	The	probability	of	choosing	the	fundamentalist	rule	is	then	given	by		𝛼!,! = 𝑃 (𝑈!,! + 𝜀!,!) > (𝑈!,! + 𝜀!,!) 																									(11)	
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In	words,	this	means	that	the	probability	of	selecting	the	fundamentalist	rule	is	equal	 to	 the	 probability	 that	 the	 stochastic	 utility	 associated	 with	 using	 the	fundamentalist	rule	exceeds	the	stochastic	utility	of	using	an	extrapolative	rule.	In	order	to	derive	a	more	precise	expression	one	has	to	specify	the	distribution	of	 the	 random	 variables	 εf,t	 and	 εe,t.	 It	 is	 customary	 in	 the	 discrete	 choice	literature	to	assume	that	these	random	variables	are	logistically	distributed	(see	Anderson,	 Palma,	 and	 Thisse(1992),	 p.35).	 	 One	 then	 obtains	 the	 following	expressions	for	the	probability	of	choosing	the	fundamentalist	rule:		𝛼!,! = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡 +𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡                                                           					(12)		Similarly	the	probability	that	an	agent	will	use	the	extrapolative	forecasting	rule	is	given	by:		𝛼!,! = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛾𝑈𝑓,𝑡 +𝑒𝑥𝑝 𝛾𝑈𝑒,𝑡 = 1− 𝛼!,!                                       (13)	Equation	 (12)	 says	 that	 as	 the	 past	 forecast	 performance	 (utility)	 of	 the	fundamentalist	rule	improves	relative	to	that	of	the	extrapolative	rule,	agents	are	more	likely	to	select	the	fundamentalist	rule	for	their	forecasts	of	the	output	gap.	Equation	 (13)	 has	 a	 similar	 interpretation.	 The	 parameter	 γ	 measures	 the	“intensity	 of	 choice”.	 It	 is	 related	 to	 the	 variance	 of	 the	 random	 components.	Defining		εt	=	εf,t	-	εe,t.	we	can	write	(see	Anderson,	Palma	and	Thisse(1992)):		𝛾 = !!"#(!!)	.		When	var(εt)	 goes	 to	 infinity,	γ	approaches	0.	 In	 that	 case	 agents	decide	 to	be	fundamentalist	 or	 extrapolator	 by	 tossing	 a	 coin	 and	 the	 probability	 to	 be	fundamentalist	 (or	extrapolator)	 is	exactly	0.5.	When	γ	=	∞	 the	variance	of	 the	random	 components	 is	 zero	 (utility	 is	 then	 fully	 deterministic)	 and	 the	probability	of	using	a	fundamentalist	rule	 is	either	1	or	0.	The	parameter	γ	can	also	be	interpreted	as	expressing	a	willingness	to	learn	from	past	performance.	When	γ	=	0	this	willingness	is	zero;	it	increases	with	the	size	of	γ.	As	 argued	 earlier,	 the	 selection	 mechanism	 used	 should	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	learning	mechanism	 based	 on	 “trial	 and	 error”.	When	 observing	 that	 the	 rule	they	use	performs	less	well	than	the	alternative	rule,	agents	are	willing	to	switch	
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to	 the	 more	 performing	 rule.	 Put	 differently,	 agents	 avoid	 making	 systematic	mistakes	by	constantly	being	willing	to	learn	from	past	mistakes	and	to	change	their	behavior.	This	also	ensures	that	the	market	forecasts	are	unbiased.		
	
2.6	Heuristics	and	selection	mechanism	in	forecasting	inflation	Agents	also	have	to	forecast	inflation	𝐸!𝜋!!!.	A	similar	simple	heuristics	is	used	as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 output	 gap	 forecasting,	 with	 one	 rule	 that	 could	 be	 called	 a	fundamentalist	rule	and	the	other	an	extrapolative	rule.	(See	Brazier	et	al.	(2008)	for	a	similar	setup).	We	assume	an	institutional	set-up	in	which	the	central	bank	announces	an	explicit	 inflation	target.	The	fundamentalist	rule	then	is	based	on	this	announced	inflation	target,	i.e.	agents	using	this	rule	have	confidence	in	the	credibility	of	 this	rule	and	use	 it	 to	 forecast	 inflation.	 	Agents	who	do	not	 trust	the	 announced	 inflation	 target	 use	 the	 extrapolative	 rule,	 which	 consists	 in	extrapolating	inflation	from	the	past	into	the	future.		The	fundamentalist	rule	will	be	called	an	“inflation	targeting”	rule.	It	consists	in	using	the	central	bank’s	inflation	target	to	forecast	future	inflation,	i.e.																											 	 							E!!"#𝜋!!! = 𝜋∗																																																																									(14)			or	after	normalization				E!!!"𝜋!!!! = 0	where	the	inflation	target	is	 			The	“extrapolators”	are	defined	by																									 	 				E!!"#𝜋!!! = 𝜋!!!																																																																								(15)				or	after		normalization		E!!"#𝜋!!!! = 𝜋!!! − 𝜋∗		The	market	forecast	is	a	weighted	average	of	these	two	forecasts,	i.e.																																					E!𝜋!!!! = 𝛽!"#,!E!!"#𝜋!!!! + 𝛽!"#,!E!!"#𝜋!!!! 																											(16)		or																			E!𝜋!!!! = 𝛽!"#,!0+ 𝛽!"#,! 𝜋!!! − 𝜋∗ = 𝛽!"#,!𝜋!!!! 															(17)								and		 					𝛽!"#,! + 𝛽!"#,! = 1																																																																									(18)		
*π
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The	 same	 selection	mechanism	 is	 used	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 output	 forecasting	 to	determine	the	probabilities	of	agents	trusting	the	inflation	target	and	those	who	do	not	trust	it	and	revert	to	extrapolation	of	past	inflation,	i.e.			 	 	 	 	 (19)			 	 	 	 (20)		where	Utar,t	and	Uext,t	are	the	forecast	performances	(utilities)	associated	with	the	use	 of	 the	 fundamentalist	 and	 extrapolative	 rules	 in	 equation	 (21)	 and	 (22).	These	are	defined	in	the	same	way	as	in	(9)	and	(10),	i.e.	they	are	the	negatives	of	the	weighted	averages	of	past	squared	forecast	errors	of	using	fundamentalist	(inflation	targeting)	and	extrapolative	rules,	respectively.	𝑈!"#,! = − ω! π!!!!! − E!,!!!!!π!!!!! !!!!! 																																									(21)	 𝑈!"#,! = − ω! π!!!!! − E!,!!!!!π!!!!! !!!!! 																																								(22)	This	inflation	forecasting	heuristics	can	be	interpreted	as	a	procedure	of	agents	to	 find	out	how	credible	 the	 central	 bank’s	 inflation	 targeting	 is.	 If	 this	 is	 very	credible,	using	the	announced	inflation	target	will	produce	good	forecasts	and	as	a	result,	the	probability	that	agents	will	rely	on	the	inflation	target	will	be	high.	If	on	 the	 other	 hand	 the	 inflation	 target	 does	 not	 produce	 good	 forecasts	(compared	to	a	simple	extrapolation	rule)	the	probability	that	agents	will	use	it	will	be	small.		Finally	 it	should	be	mentioned	that	 the	two	prediction	rules	 for	 the	output	gap	and	 inflation	 are	 made	 independently.	 This	 is	 a	 strong	 assumption.	 What	 we	model	 is	 the	 use	 of	 different	 forecasting	 rules.	 The	 selection	 criterion	 is	exclusively	based	on	the	forecasting	performances	of	these	rules.	Agents	 in	our	model	do	not	have	a	psychological	predisposition	to	become	fundamentalists	or	extrapolators.	 	However,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 despite	 the	 assumption	 of	independence,	 the	 realized	 choices	 generated	 from	 our	 model	 are	 actually	correlated	due	to	the	interactions	of	the	different	variables	in	the	model.	We	will	come	 back	 to	 this	 when	 we	 implement	 the	 model	 and	 we	 will	 compute	 the	
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realized	correlation	between	the	probabilities	of	being	a	fundamentalist	 for	the	output	gap	and	a	fundamentalist	for	inflation.	
	
2.7	Defining	animal	spirits	The	forecasts	made	by	extrapolators	and	fundamentalists	play	an	important	role	in	 the	 model.	 In	 order	 to	 highlight	 this	 role	 we	 define	 an	 index	 of	 market	sentiments,	which	we	call	“animal	spirits”,	and	which	reflects	how	optimistic	or	pessimistic	these	forecasts	are.		The	definition	of	animal	spirits	is	as	follows:	
𝑆! =    𝛼!,! − 𝛼!,!         𝑖𝑓 𝑦!!! > 0   −𝛼!,! + 𝛼!,!    𝑖𝑓 𝑦!!! < 0 		 	 	 													 (23)	where	𝑆! is	the	index	of	animal	spirits.	This	can	change	between	-1	and	+1.	There	are	two	possibilities:	
• When	𝑦!!! > 0,	extrapolators	 forecast	a	positive	output	gap.	The	 fraction	of	agents	who	make	such	a	positive	forecasts	is	𝛼!,! .	Fundamentalists,	however,	then	make	a	pessimistic	forecast	since	they	expect	the	positive	output	gap	to	decline	towards	the	equilibrium	value	of	0.	The	fraction	of	agents	who	make	such	a	forecast	is	𝛼!,! .	We	subtract	this	fraction	of	pessimistic	forecasts	from	the	fraction	𝛼!,!	who	make	a	positive	forecast.	When	these	two	fractions	are	equal	 to	 each	 other	 (both	 are	 then	 0.5)	market	 sentiments	 (animal	 spirits)	are	 neutral,	 i.e.	 optimists	 and	 pessimists	 cancel	 out	 and	 St	 =	 0.	 When	 the	fraction	of	optimists	𝛼!,!	exceeds	 the	 fraction	of	pessimists	𝛼!,! ,	 	St	 becomes	positive.	As	we	will	see,	the	model	allows	for	the	possibility	that	𝛼!,! moves	to	1.	In	that	case	there	are	only	optimists	and	S! = 1.		
• When	𝑦!!! < 0,	extrapolators	forecast	a	negative	output	gap.	The	fraction	of	agents	 who	make	 such	 a	 negative	 forecasts	 is	𝛼!,!.	 We	 give	 this	 fraction	 a	negative	 sign.	 Fundamentalists,	 however,	 then	make	 an	 optimistic	 forecast	since	 they	 expect	 the	 negative	 output	 gap	 to	 increase	 towards	 the	equilibrium	 value	 of	 0.	 The	 fraction	 of	 agents	who	make	 such	 a	 forecast	 is	𝛼!,! .	We	give	this	fraction	of	optimistic	forecasts	a	positive	sign.	When	these	two	fractions	are	equal	to	each	other	(both	are	then	0.5)	market	sentiments	
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(animal	spirits)	are	neutral,	i.e.	optimists	and	pessimists	cancel	out	and	St	=	0.	When	the	 fraction	of	pessimists 𝛼!,!	exceeds	 the	 fraction	of	optimists	𝛼!,!		St	becomes	negative.	The	fraction	of	pessimists,	 𝛼!,! ,		can	move	to	1.	In	that	case	there	are	only	pessimists	and	St	=	-1.		We	can	rewrite	(23)	as	follows:		
𝑆! =    𝛼!,! − (1− 𝛼!,! ) =  2 𝛼!,! − 1           𝑖𝑓 𝑦!!! > 0   −𝛼!,! + (1− 𝛼!,!) = −2 𝛼!,! + 1    𝑖𝑓 𝑦!!! < 0 												(24)	Finally	 it	 should	be	noted	 that	 there	 is	 a	 relation	between	our	 index	of	 animal	spirits	St	and	the	forecast	errors	chartists	and	fundamentalists	make1.	We	show	this	in	appendix.		
2.8	Solving	the	model	The	 solution	 of	 the	 model	 is	 found	 by	 first	 substituting	 (3a)	 into	 (1a)	 and	rewriting	in	matrix	notation.	This	yields:		1 −𝑏!−𝑎!𝑐! 1− 𝑎!𝑐! 𝜋!!𝑦!= 𝑏! 0−𝑎! 𝑎! E!𝜋!!!!E!𝑦!!! + 1− 𝑏! 00 1− 𝑎! 𝜋!!!!𝑦!!! + 0𝑎!𝑐! 𝑟!!!! + 𝜂!𝑎!𝑢! + 𝜀! 		i.e.	 𝑨𝒁𝒕 = 𝑩𝑬𝒕 𝒁𝒕!𝟏 + 𝑪𝒁𝒕!𝟏 + 𝒃𝑟!!!! + 𝒗𝒕																															(25)		 	 	 	where	bold	characters	refer	to	matrices	and	vectors.	The	solution	for	Zt		is	given	by		 𝒁𝒕 = 𝑨!𝟏 𝑩𝑬𝒕 𝒁𝒕!𝟏 + 𝑪𝒁𝒕!𝟏 + 𝒃𝑟!!!! + 𝒗𝒕 																				(26)		 	 		 	The	 solution	 exists	 if	 the	matrix	A	 is	 non-singular,	 i.e.	 (1-a2c2)-a2b2c1	 ≠	 0.	The	system	(26)	describes	the	solutions	for	yt	and	𝜋!! 	given	the	forecasts	of	yt	and	𝜋!! .	The	 latter	 have	 been	 specified	 in	 equations	 (7)	 and	 (17)	 and	 therefore	 can	 be	substituted	into	(26).	Finally,	the	solution	for	𝑟!!!! 	is	found	by	substituting	yt	and	
πt	obtained	from	(26)	into	(3a).			The	 model	 has	 non-linear	 features	 making	 it	 difficult	 to	 arrive	 at	 analytical	solutions.	That	is	why	we	will	use	numerical	methods	to	analyze	its	dynamics.	In																																																									
1 The existence of such a relationship was pointed out to us by a referee of our paper.  
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order	to	do	so,	we	have	to	calibrate	the	model,	i.e.	to	select	numerical	values	for	the	parameters	of	 the	model.	 In	Table	1	 the	parameters	used	 in	 the	calibration	exercise	 are	 presented.	 The	 values	 of	 the	 parameters	 are	 based	 on	 what	 we	found	in	the	literature	(see	Gali(2008)	for	the	demand	and	supply	equations	and	Blattner	and	Margaritov(2010)	for	the	Taylor	rule).	The	model	was	calibrated	in	such	a	way	that	the	time	units	can	be	considered	to	be	quarters.	The	three	shocks	(demand	shocks,	supply	shocks	and	interest	rate	shocks)	are	independently	and	identically	 distributed	 (i.i.d.)	 with	 standard	 deviations	 of	 0.5%.	 These	 shocks	produce	 standard	 deviations	 of	 the	 output	 gap	 and	 inflation	 that	 mimic	 the	standard	deviations	found	in	the	empirical	data	using	quarterly	observations	for	the	 US	 and	 the	 Eurozone.	 We	 describe	 the	 procedure	 that	 led	 us	 to	 select	standard	deviations	of	0.5%	in	Appendix	C.		
Table	1:	Parameter	values	of	the	calibrated	model 
 a1	=	0.5						 coefficient	of	expected	output	in	output	equation	a2	=	-0.2				 interest	elasticity	of	output	demand	b1	=	0.5					 coefficient	of	expected	inflation	in	inflation	equation	b2	=	0.05			 coefficient	of	output	in	inflation	equation	c1	=	1.5		 coefficient	of	inflation	in	Taylor	equation	c2	=	0.5				 coefficient	of	output	in	Taylor	equation	c3	=	0.8				 interest	smoothing	parameter	in	Taylor	equation	𝛾	=	2			 			 intensity	of	choice	parameter	𝜎! 	=	0.5							 standard	deviation	shocks	output	𝜎! 	=	0.5							 standard	deviation	shocks	inflation	𝜎!	=	0.5							 standard	deviation	shocks	Taylor	𝜌 =	0.5														measures	the	speed	of	declining	weights	in	mean	squares	errors	(memory	parameter)		
	
3.	Inflation	targeting	and	the	zero	lower	bound		In	this	section	we	present	the	results	of	simulating	the	model	for	different	values	of	the	inflation	target	(going	from	0%	to	4%),	and	imposing	a	zero	lower	bound	(ZLB)	on	the	nominal	interest	rate:																																																	r! ≥ 0																																																																							(27)	Without	the	ZLB	condition,	the	central	bank	is	able	to	adjust	its	nominal	interest	rate	to	achieve	a	real	interest	rate	that	stabilizes	the	output	gap.	However,	with	the	 ZLB	 condition,	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 central	 bank	 to	 stabilize	 the	 output	 gap	(especially	a	negative	one)	is	very	much	hindered.		
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We	start	by	presenting	the	results	using	an	inflation	target	of	2%.	This	will	allow	us	to	understand	the	main	features	of	the	model.	We	then	present	the	results	for	alternative	levels	of	the	inflation	target.				
3.1	The	basic	results	We	simulated	the	model	over	2,000	periods.	(This	will	be	the	general	 length	of	the	simulation	runs.	In	a	few	cases	we	will	increase	this	length	to	10,000	to	raise	the	precision).	We	present	 the	results	 in	 the	time	domain	and	 in	the	 frequency	domain.	Figure	1	shows	the	movements	of	the	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	 in	the	 time	 domain	 (left	 hand	 side	 panels).	We	 selected	 a	 sample	 of	 200	 periods	(quarters)	that	is	representative	of	the	full	simulation.	The	right	hand	side	panel	shows	 the	 output	 gap	 and	 animal	 spirits	 in	 the	 frequency	 domain	 for	 the	 full	2,000	 periods.	 We	 observe	 that	 the	 model	 produces	 waves	 of	 optimism	 and	pessimism	(animal	spirits)	that	can	lead	to	a	situation	where	everybody	becomes	optimist	(St	=	1)	or	pessimist	(St	=	-1).	These	waves	of	optimism	and	pessimism	are	generated	endogenously	and	arise	because	optimistic	(pessimistic)	forecasts	are	 self-fulfilling	 and	 therefore	 attract	 more	 agents	 into	 being	 optimists	(pessimists).		As	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 left	 hand	 side	 panels,	 the	 correlation	 of	 these	 animal	spirits	 and	 the	output	 gap	 is	 high.	 In	 the	 simulations	 reported	 in	 Figure	1	 this	correlation	reaches	0.94.	Underlying	 this	 correlation	 is	 the	self-fulfilling	nature	of	 expectations.	 When	 a	 wave	 of	 optimism	 is	 set	 in	 motion,	 this	 leads	 to	 an	increase	 in	 aggregate	 demand	 (see	 equation	 (1)).	 This	 increase	 in	 aggregate	demand	leads	to	a	situation	in	which	those	who	have	made	optimistic	forecasts	are	vindicated.	This	attracts	more	agents	using	optimistic	forecasts.	This	leads	to	a	self-fulfilling	dynamics	in	which	most	agents	become	optimists.	It	is	a	dynamics	that	leads	to	a	correlation	of	the	same	beliefs.	The	reverse	is	also	true.	A	wave	of	pessimistic	 forecasts	 can	 set	 in	 motion	 a	 self-fulfilling	 dynamics	 leading	 to	 a	downturn	 in	economic	activity	(output	gap).	 	At	some	point	most	of	 the	agents	have	become	pessimists.		
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Figure	1:	Output	gap	and	animal	spirits	in	time	and	frequency	domains		 (Inflation	target	=	2%)	
	
	
Note:	LHS	shows	simulated	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	in	time	domain,	RHS	in	frequency	domain	when	inflation	target	is	2%.	The	distribution	of	output	gap	has	fat	tails	and	excess	kurtosis	and	is	slightly	skewed.		Frequency	ZLB-hits	=	26%;	mean	ZLB-spell=4.8	quarters.		The	 right	 hand	 side	 panels	 show	 the	 frequency	distribution	 of	 output	 gap	 and	animal	 spirits.	 We	 find	 that	 the	 output	 gap	 is	 not	 normally	 distributed,	 with	excess	kurtosis	and	fat	tails.	We	find	a	kurtosis	=	4	which	is	too	high	for	a	normal	distribution.	A	Jarque-Bera	test	rejects	normality	of	the	distribution	of	the	output	gap.	The	origin	of	the	non-normality	of	the	distribution	of	the	output	gap	(excess	kurtosis	and	fat	tails)	can	be	found	in	the	distribution	of	the	animal	spirits.	We	find	that	there	is	a	concentration	of	observations	of	animal	spirits	around	0.	This	means	 that	much	of	 the	 time	 there	 is	no	 clear-cut	 optimism	or	pessimism.	We	can	 call	 these	 “normal	 periods”.	 There	 is	 also,	 however,	 a	 concentration	 of	extreme	 values	 at	 either	 -1	 (extreme	 pessimism)	 and	 +1	 (extreme	 optimism).	These	 extreme	 values	 of	 animal	 spirits	 explain	 the	 fat	 tails	 observed	 in	 the	distribution	 of	 the	 output	 gap.	 The	 interpretation	 of	 this	 result	 is	 as	 follows.	
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When	 the	 market	 is	 gripped	 by	 a	 self-fulfilling	 movement	 of	 optimism	 (or	pessimism)	 this	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 situation	 where	 everybody	 becomes	 optimist	(pessimist).	This	then	also	leads	to	an	intense	boom	(bust)	in	economic	activity.		In	De	Grauwe(2012)	and	De	Grauwe	and	Ji(2016)	empirical	evidence	is	provided	indicating	 that	 observed	 output	 gaps	 in	 industrial	 countries	 exhibit	 excess	kurtosis	and	fat	tails	(see	also	Fagiolo,	et	al.	(2008)	and	Ascari,	et	al(2015)),	and	that	 the	 output	 gaps	 are	 highly	 correlated	 with	 empirical	 measures	 of	 animal	spirits.		Our	model	mimics	these	empirical	observations	and	is	particularly	suited	to	understand	the	nature	of	business	cycles,	which	is	characterized	by	periods	of	“tranquility”,	 alternated	 by	 periods	 of	 booms	 and	 busts.	 	 We	 return	 to	 the	empirical	validation	of	the	model	in	section	6.	In	 order	 to	 improve	 understanding	 of	 the	model	 it	 is	 also	 useful	 to	 relate	 the	fractions	 of	 extrapolators	 and	 fundamentalists	 to	 the	 performance	 (utility)	 of	these	 rules	 (as	measured	by	 the	negative	of	 the	 forecast	errors).	We	do	 this	 in	Figures	 A2	 to	 A4	 (see	 Appendix	 B).	We	 observe	 the	 strong	 correlation	 of	 the	relative	 performance	 of	 the	 extrapolating	 rule	 versus	 the	 fundamentalist	 rule	(measured	by	the	difference	in	utilities	of	using	these	rules)	and	the	fraction	of	the	agents	using	the	extrapolating	rule.		It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of	 forecasting	 in	 this	 model	 by	focusing	 on	 the	 systematic	 patterns	 in	 the	 forecasting	 errors.	 Using	 the	simulation	 over	 2,000	 periods	 reported	 in	 Figure	 1,	 we	 find	 that	 there	 is	autocorrelation	in	the	forecasting	errors.	For	the	output	gap	this	autocorrelation	is	0.37,	while	for	inflation	this	is	0.15.	We	also	find	that	the	standard	deviations	of	these	forecasting	errors	amounts	to	0.60	in	the	case	of	the	output	gap	and	0.5	in	 the	 case	 of	 inflation,	 and	 that	 there	 is	 a	 small	 negative	 correlation	 of	 -0.2	between	the	 forecasting	errors	of	 the	output	gap	and	of	 inflation.	We	note	that	there	is	some	variation	in	these	numbers	as	they	depend	on	the	realization	of	the	stochastic	shocks.	We	therefore	decided	to	increase	the	length	of	the	simulation	run	to	10,000	and	 found	that	 these	numbers	converge	 to	0.35	and	0.14	 for	 the	autocorrelations	 in	 the	 forecasting	 errors	 in	 output	 gap	 and	 inflation.	 The	standard	 deviations	 of	 the	 forecasting	 errors	 in	 output	 gap	 and	 inflation	converge	to	0.62	and	0.49.	Finally,	the	correlation	between	the	forecasting	errors	
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of	 the	output	gap	and	 inflation	settled	at	 -0.15.	 In	 the	empirical	 section	6.4	we	compare	these	theoretical	forecast	errors	with	those	obtained	using	the	Survey	of	Business	Forecasts	(SBF)	of	the	European	Central	Bank.		Finally,	 we	 computed	 the	 correlation	 between	 the	 probabilities	 of	 being	 a	fundamentalist	 for	 the	 output	 gap	 and	 a	 fundamentalist	 for	 inflation	 (the	fractions	𝛼!,!	and	𝛽!"#,!	defined	in	(12)	and	(19),	respectively).	We	find	that	this	correlation	is	approximately	0.3	(depending	on	the	realization	of	the	stochastic	shocks).	 	 Thus,	 despite	 the	 assumption	of	 independence	 in	 the	 selection	of	 the	forecasting	 rules,	 the	 realized	 choices	 generated	 from	 our	 model	 are	 actually	correlated.	This	is	due	to	the	interactions	of	the	different	variables	in	the	model.		We	now	ask	the	question	of	how	the	results	shown	in	Figure	1	are	affected	by	the	level	of	 the	 inflation	target	chosen	by	the	central	bank.	We	start	by	noting	that	the	output	gap	in	Figure	1	 is	slightly	skewed	to	the	 left.	 In	 fact	the	skewness	 is	found	to	be	-0.66.	This	skewness	finds	its	origin	in	the	fact	that	the	distribution	of	 animal	 spirits	 is	 also	 skewed	 to	 the	 left,	 i.e.	 there	 are	 more	 periods	 of	pessimism	 than	optimism.	We	 find	 that	 on	 average	 animal	 spirits	 are	negative		(-0.03).	We	also	find	that	the	interest	rate	is	hitting	the	ZLB	26%	of	the	time	and	that	the	mean	ZLB-spell	is	4.8	quarters.		In	 order	 to	 evaluate	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 inflation	 target	 we	 simulated	 the	model	under	two	alternative	and	extreme	assumptions	of	the	inflation	targets.	In	the	first	one	we	set	the	inflation	target	equal	to	0%;	in	the	second	one	to	4%.	We	show	the	results	in	Figures	2	and	3.	Our	major	 findings	are	 the	 following.	We	observe	 from	Figure	2	 that	when	 the	inflation	 target	 is	zero	we	obtain	a	very	skewed	distribution	of	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	(skewness	 is	 -0.96	and	mean	animal	spirits	 is	 -0.22).	Most	of	 the	time	animal	spirits	are	negative	with	many	periods	of	extreme	pessimism.	There	are	very	few	periods	of	optimism.	This	can	also	be	seen	from	the	simulations	in	the	time	domain:	the	output	gap	is	negative	most	of	the	time	and	animal	spirits	are	also	negative	most	of	the	time.	The	probability	of	hitting	the	ZLB	is	64%	and	once	the	ZLB	is	hit	the	mean	length	of	staying	in	the	ZLB	is	more	than	9	quarters.	Thus	it	can	be	concluded	when	the	central	bank	sets	an	inflation	target	equal	to	
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zero	pessimism	prevails	most	of	the	time	and	recession	is	a	chronic	feature	of	the	business	cycle	with	very	few	periods	of	optimism.	We	obtain	very	different	 results	with	an	 inflation	 target	of	4%.	The	results	are	presented	in	Figure	3.	We	now	find	that	the	distributions	of	the	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	are	symmetric.	Skewness	of	output	gap	is	not	statistically	different	from	0	and	animal	spirits	are	0	on	average.	Periods	of	optimism	and	pessimism	occur	equally	frequently.	The	number	of	times	the	ZLB	is	hit	is	less	than	10%	and	the	mean	length	of	a	ZLB-spell	has	dropped	to	3.2	quarters.		
Figure	2:	Output	gap	and	animal	spirits	in	time	and	frequency	domains	(Inflation	target	=	0%)	
	
	
Note:	LHS	shows	simulated	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	in	time	domain,	RHS	in	frequency	 domain	 when	 inflation	 target	 is	 0%.	 Distribution	 output	 gap	 and	animal	spirits	negatively	skewed	Frequency	ZLB-hits	=	64%;	mean	ZLB-spell=9.1	quarters		
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Figure	3:	Output	gap	and	animal	spirits	in	time	and	frequency	domains	(Inflation	target	=	4%)	
	 	
	
Note:	LHS	shows	simulated	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	in	time	domain,	RHS	in	the	 frequency	 domain	 when	 inflation	 target	 is	 4%.	 Symmetric	 distribution	 of	output	gap	and	animal	spirits.	Frequency	ZLB-hits	=	9%;	mean	ZLB-spell=3.2	quarters		In	order	to	obtain	a	more	precise	idea	about	the	relation	between	inflation	target	and	 the	 asymmetry	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 output	 gap	 and	 animal	 spirits	 we	computed	 the	skewness	of	 the	distribution	of	output	gap	and	 the	mean	animal	spirits	for	different	values	of	the	level	of	the	inflation	target.	We	show	the	results	in	Figures	4	and	5	(Note	that	the	length	of	the	simulation	runs	is	2,000	periods).	From	Figure	4	we	conclude	that	as	the	inflation	target	increases	the	skewness	of	the	distribution	of	the	output	gap	declines.		It	reaches	values	close	to	0	when	the	inflation	 target	 is	3%.	We	note	 the	non-linear	 relation	between	 inflation	 target	and	 skewness.	 With	 an	 inflation	 target	 equal	 to	 2%	 skewness	 is	 reduced	substantially	but	there	is	still	a	significant	amount	of	skewness,	suggesting	that	an	 inflation	 target	 of	 2%	 may	 not	 be	 optimal.	 We	 return	 to	 the	 question	 of	optimality	in	the	next	section.		
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Figure	5	shows	the	relation	between	inflation	target	and	the	mean	animal	spirits.	We	find	that	when	the	inflation	target	increases	the	mean	value	of	animal	spirits	increases	 in	 a	 non-linear	 way.	 Put	 differently	 with	 increasing	 inflation	 target	(starting	 from	 0%)	 endemic	 pessimism	 is	 reduced	 significantly.	 	 When	 the	inflation	 target	 reaches	 3%	 animal	 spirits	 are	 zero	 on	 average,	 i.e.	 periods	 of	optimism	and	pessimism	are	equally	probable.		
Figure	4:		 	 	 	 Figure	5	 	 		
	 	
Note:	An	increase	of	the	inflation	target	reduces	the	negative	skewness	of	the	output	gap	and	reduces	pessimism	(negative	animal	spirits)		How	 can	 these	 results	 be	 interpreted?	 When	 the	 inflation	 target	 is	 0%	 the	cyclical	movements	in	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	inevitably	lead	to	recessions	that	 also	 drive	 inflation	 into	 negative	 territory.	 When	 that	 happens	 the	 zero	bound	constraint	that	applies	to	the	nominal	 interest	rates	makes	it	 impossible	for	the	central	bank	to	 lower	the	real	 interest	rate.	 If	 the	recession	is	deep	and	deflation	intense	the	real	interest	rate	is	likely	to	increase	significantly.	Thus	the	recession	 becomes	 protracted.	 Pessimism	 sets	 in	 and	 amplifies	 the	 recession,	and	 validates	 pessimism.	 As	 the	 central	 bank	 loses	 its	 stabilizing	 capacity	 the	economy	gets	stuck	in	pessimism,	recession	and	deflation.	We	conclude	that	an	inflation	target	of	0%	becomes	a	breeding	ground	for	pessimism	and	recession.	The	 way	 out	 is	 to	 increase	 the	 inflation	 target.	 Our	 results	 suggest	 that	 an	inflation	 target	 of	 3%-4%	 is	 probably	 better	 than	 2%	 in	making	 sure	 that	 the	economy	does	not	get	stuck	in	the	chronic	pessimism	trap.	
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Finally	we	also	looked	at	the	number	of	times	the	zero	lower	bound	was	hit	for	different	 levels	 of	 the	 inflation	 target.	We	 show	 the	 results	 in	Figure	6.	On	 the	horizontal	axis	we	show	the	inflation	target;	on	the	vertical	axis	we	present	the	number	of	ZLB-hits	 (In	order	 to	 increase	 the	precision	we	 raised	 the	 length	of	the	 simulation	 runs	 to	 10,000	 periods).	We	 observe	 a	 non-linear	 relationship:	when	the	inflation	target	is	0%	the	number	of	times	the	ZLB	is	hit	exceeds	60%.	The	number	of	hits	 then	declines	when	 the	 inflation	 target	 is	 raised.	Note	 that	when	the	inflation	target	is	2%	we	hit	the	ZLB	about	26%	of	the	time.	In	that	case	we	find	that	the	typical	length	of	a	ZLB-episode	is	5	quarters.	
	 	 	 Figure	6	
	
Note:	An	increase	in	the	inflation	target	reduces	the	probability	of	hitting	the	ZLB	
3.2	The	role	of	animal	spirits	What	is	the	importance	of	animal	spirits	in	creating	skewness	in	the	output	gap?	The	 way	 we	 want	 to	 answer	 this	 question	 is	 to	 compare	 the	 results	 of	 the	behavioral	 model	 with	 the	 three-equations	 New	 Keynesian	 model	 (aggregate	demand,	 aggregate	 supply	 and	Taylor	 rule)	 solved	under	 rational	 expectations	(RE).	We	know	that	 in	a	RE-model	animal	spirits	play	no	role.	A	comparison	of	our	 behavioral	 model	 where	 animal	 spirits	 play	 a	 central	 role	 with	 the	 same	structural	model	under	rational	expectations	will	allow	us	to	 isolate	the	role	of	animal	spirits.		We	used	the	model	consisting	of	equations	(1a)	to	(3a)	and	solved	these	under	rational	expectations	imposing	a	zero	lower	bound	on	the	nominal	interest	rate.	
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We	assumed	the	same	parameters	and	the	same	distribution	of	shocks	as	in	the	behavioral	model.	We	 simulated	 the	model	 for	 different	 levels	 of	 the	 inflation	target	 (from	 0%	 to	 4%).	 We	 show	 the	 results	 in	 Figure	 7.	 This	 presents	 the	simulated	 output	 gaps	 in	 the	 frequency	 domain.	 We	 observe	 that	 with	 an	inflation	 target	 of	 0%	 the	 distribution	 has	 a	 negative	 skewness	 (-0.37).	 This	skewness	 tends	 to	 decline	 as	 the	 inflation	 target	 is	 raised.	When	 the	 inflation	target	 is	 4%,	 the	 skewness	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 output	 gap	 is	 not	significantly	 different	 from	 zero.	 When	 comparing	 these	 results	 with	 those	obtained	 in	 the	 behavioral	 model	 (Figures	 1	 to	 3)	 we	 find	 that	 the	 degree	 of	skewness	is	much	less	pronounced	in	the	rational	expectations	model	than	in	the	behavioral	model.			
Figure	7:	Frequency	distribution	output	gap	in	rational	expectations	model	Inflation	target=0%	 	 	 Inflation	target=2%	
	 	Skewness	=	-0.37	 	 	 	 Skewness	=	-0.20	ZLB=	47%;	mean	ZLB-spell=3.1	 	 ZLB	=	8%;	mean	ZLB-spell=1.6											 	 	 	Inflation	target	=	4%	
	Skewness=0.01	ZLB=	0.5%;	mean	ZLB-spell=1.3	
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Note:	Skewness	distribution	of	output	gap	in	RE-model	is	less	pronounced	than	in	behavioral	model.		As	in	behavioral	model	it	declines	with	the	level	of	inflation	target.		We	also	computed	the	number	of	ZLB-hits	and	the	mean	length	of	time	of	ZLB-episodes	in	the	RE-model.	These	are	shown	below	the	charts	of	Figure	7.	With	an	inflation	 target	 of	 0%	 the	 number	 of	 ZLB-hits	 is	 47%	 (versus	 64%	 in	 the	behavioral	model).	 It	 declines	 sharply	when	 the	 inflation	 target	 increases	 (8%	ZLB-hits	when	 inflation	 target=2%	 (versus	 26%	 in	 the	 behavioral	model),	 and	0.5%	ZLB-hits	when	 inflation	 target=4%	 (versus	9%	 in	behavioral	model).	We	find	 that	 in	 each	 of	 these	 cases	 the	 number	 of	 ZLB-hits	 is	 lower	 than	 in	 the	behavioral	model	(see	Figure	6).		This	 difference	 between	 the	 RE-model	 and	 the	 behavioral	 model	 is	 equally	pronounced	for	the	mean	length	of	ZLB-episodes.		In	the	RE-model,	these	are	3.1,	1.6	 and	 1.3	 quarters	 compared	 to	 9.1,	 4.8,	 and	 3.2	 quarters	 in	 the	 behavioral	model,	for	inflation	targets	increasing	from	0%	to	4%.	These	results	lead	to	the	conclusion	 that	by	 amplifying	 the	movements	of	 the	output	 gap,	 animal	 spirits	push	 the	 output	 gap	more	 frequently	 and	 keep	 it	 longer	 in	 negative	 territory	than	 in	 a	 RE-model.	 As	 a	 result,	 animal	 spiritis	 produce	 more	 protracted	economic	 downturns	 when	 the	 inflation	 target	 is	 set	 too	 low	 than	 what	 is	obtained	in	a	RE-model.		
	
	
4.	Impulse	responses	to	demand	and	supply	shocks	In	 this	 section	 we	 compute	 impulse	 responses	 to	 demand	 and	 supply	 shocks	assuming	 different	 levels	 of	 inflation	 target.	 We	 will	 assume	 two	 different	inflation	 targets	 0%	 and	 4%	 (the	 2%	 inflation	 target	 regime	 is	 intermediate	between	 these	 two	 extremes).	 These	 impulse	 responses	 are	 expressed	 as	“multipliers”,	 i.e.	 the	 output	 responses	 to	 the	 shock	 are	 divided	 by	 the	 shock	itself	 (which	 is	 two	 standard	deviations	 of	 the	 error	 terms	 in	 the	demand	 and	supply	equations).			In	contrast	to	linear	rational	expectations	models	the	impulse	responses	depend	on	the	timing	of	the	shock.	Put	differently,	an	impulse	response	computed	with	
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one	 realization	 of	 the	 stochastic	 shocks	 in	 the	 equations	 of	 the	model	 will	 be	different	 from	 an	 impulse	 response	 to	 exactly	 the	 same	 shock	 but	 performed	using	another	realization	of	these	stochastic	shocks.	This	is	the	case	even	when	all	parameters	of	the	model	are	identical.		In	 order	 to	 illustrate	 this	 we	 simulated	 1000	 impulse	 responses	 to	 the	 same	shock	(demand	respectively	supply),	assuming	each	time	a	different	realization	of	stochastic	shocks.	We	then	computed	the	mean	response	obtained	from	these	1000	 impulse	 responses	 together	 with	 the	 impulse	 responses	 two	 standard	deviations	above	and	below	the	mean	response.	The	results	are	shown	in	Figures	8	and	9	for	the	demand	shock	and	Figure	10	for	the	supply	shock.	We	show	the	results	for	two	inflation	target	regimes,	0%	and	4%.		
4.1	Impulse	responses	to	a	negative	demand	shock	We	first	discuss	 the	 impulse	responses	 to	 the	negative	demand	shock5.	 (Figure	8).	Two	results	stand	out.	First,	there	is	great	uncertainty	about	the	transmission	of	a	shock	even	if	the	parameters	of	the	model	are	known	with	certainty,	as	this	transmission	 depends	 on	 “initial	 conditions”,	 i.e.	 on	 the	 configuration	 of	stochastic	disturbances	that	prevail	at	the	moment	the	demand	shock	occurs.	For	example,	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 demand	 shock	 may	 be	 very	 different	 depending	 on	whether	the	shock	occurs	during	a	recession,	a	boom	or	in	more	normal	business	cycle	 conditions.	 Thus,	 in	 our	model	 the	 timing	 of	 the	 shock	matters.	We	 also	note	 that	 this	 uncertainty	 is	 more	 pronounced	 in	 the	 0%	 inflation	 targeting	regime	than	in	the	4%	regime.		
Figure	8:	Impulse	responses	to	negative	demand	shock	
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Note:	With	high	inflation	target	economic	recovery	is	faster	after	initial	negative	demand	shock		Second,	 after	 the	 initial	 negative	demand	 shock,	 the	 output	 gap	 recovers	more	quickly	and	animal	spirits	become	neutral	faster	when	the	inflation	target	is	4%	than	when	it	is	0%.	We	observe	that	in	the	4%	inflation	target	regime,	the	output	gap	reaches	zero	after	8	quarters,	while	it	takes	12	quarters	for	the	output	gap	to	reach	 zero	 in	 the	0%	 inflation	 target	 regime.	For	 the	animal	 spirits	 it	 takes	15	quarters	 to	become	neutral	 in	 the	 latter	 regime	as	 compared	 to	10	quarters	 in	the	4%	inflation	 target	regime.	Thus,	when	the	 inflation	 target	 is	set	at	4%	the	economy	recovers	faster	from	a	negative	demand	shock	than	when	the	inflation	target	is	set	at	the	low	level	of	0%.		This	difference	is	of	course	associated	with	the	fact	that	 in	a	4%	inflation	target	regime	there	is	more	scope	for	the	central	bank	 to	 stabilize	 the	business	 cycle	by	 lowering	 the	 interest	 rate	 (see	 last	 two	charts	in	Figure	8).		It	 will	 be	 useful	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 short-term	 impulse	 responses	 of	 the	 demand	shock.	 The	way	we	 do	 this	 is	 by	 presenting	 the	 frequency	 distributions	 of	 the	short-term	 effects	 of	 the	 demand	 shock.	 These	 frequency	 distributions	 are	obtained	by	collecting	the	impulse	responses	obtained	in	the	4th	quarter	after	the	
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shock	occurred.	In	so	doing	we	obtained	1000	short-term	output	responses	and	1000	 short-term	 responses	 of	 animal	 spirits.	 We	 plot	 these	 in	 the	 frequency	domain.	The	results	are	shown	in	Figure	9.		The	most	striking	result	 in	Figure	9	 is	 the	 fact	 that	when	the	 inflation	 target	 is	high	(4%)	the	negative	 impact	on	output	 following	a	negative	demand	shock	 is	significantly	lower,	on	average,	than	when	the	inflation	target	is	low	(0%).	At	the	same	 time,	 the	 short-term	 responses	 in	 animal	 spirits	 are	 on	 average	 more	negative	 with	 a	 low	 inflation	 target	 than	 with	 a	 high	 one.	 But	 as	 mentioned	earlier,	 there	 is	 a	wide	 variation	 in	 the	 short-term	 effect	 of	 the	 same	 demand	shock	on	output	and	animal	spirits.	This	variation	tends	to	be	higher	when	the	inflation	target	is	low.		Focusing	 on	 the	 short-term	 interest	 rate	 responses,	 we	 find	 that	 when	 the	inflation	target	is	zero,	the	interest	rate	response	to	the	negative	demand	shock	is	zero	 in	more	than	half	of	 the	cases	(1000	replications	of	 the	same	shock).	 In	other	words	when	the	 inflation	target	 is	zero	the	negative	demand	shock	 leads	the	interest	rate	to	hit	the	ZLB	in	more	than	half	of	the	cases.	When	the	inflation	target	is	4%	the	number	of	ZLB-hits	almost	completely	disappears.		The	mechanism	that	drives	these	results	 is	 the	same	as	the	one	we	unveiled	 in	the	previous	sections.	With	a	zero	inflation	target	there	is	little	scope	for	output	stabilization	following	a	negative	demand	shock	because	the	interest	rate	is	very	likely	to	hit	the	ZLB.	As	a	result,	this	shock	will	have	a	stronger	negative	output	effect	 in	 a	 low	 inflation	 target	 environment	 as	 compared	with	 a	 high	 inflation	target	environment.	Animal	spirits	amplify	these	differences.	When	the	inflation	target	=	0%	the	negative	demand	shock	together	with	the	inability	of	the	central	banks	to	stimulate	output	by	reducing	the	interest	rate	creates	more	pessimism	than	when	the	inflation	target	=	4%	(see	figure	8).		In	the	latter	case	the	central	bank	 is	 capable	 of	 stabilizing	 output.	 This	 in	 turn	 reduces	 pessimism	 and	reinforces	the	stabilization	effort	of	the	central	bank.		
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Figure	 9:	 Frequency	 distribution	 of	 short-term	 responses	 to	 negative	
demand	shock	
	
	
	 	
	
	 	
Note:	when	inflation	target	is	high	(4%)	the	negative	short-term	impact	on	output	after	negative	demand	shock	is	significantly	lower,	on	average,	than	when	the	inflation	target	is	low	(0%).	There	is	great	uncertainty	about	this	effect.		
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4.2	Impulse	responses	to	a	positive	supply	shock	In	this	section	we	analyze	the	impulse	responses	to	a	positive	supply	shock6.	The	positive	 supply	 shock	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 positive	 shock	 in	 productivity,	shifting	 the	 supply	 curve	 downwards	 and	 producing	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 rate	 of	inflation.	An	inflation	targeting	central	bank	will	react	to	this	decline	in	the	rate	of	 inflation	 by	 lowering	 the	 interest	 rate.	 The	 capacity	 to	 do	 so,	 however,	 is	limited	if	the	inflation	target	is	low	(0%).	It	increases	when	the	inflation	target	is	raised.	The	effects	are	shown	in	Figure	10.		We	observe	 that	 in	 a	 regime	of	high	 inflation	 targeting	 (4%)	 the	 impact	of	 the	positive	supply	shock	on	the	output	gap	is	higher	than	in	the	case	of	low	inflation	target	 (0%).	 Similarly,	 animal	 spirits	 become	 more	 positive	 after	 the	 supply	shock	in	the	high	inflation	target	than	in	the	low	inflation	target	regime.	The	underlying	mechanism	that	drives	these	differences	is	the	different	interest	rate	responses	to	the	positive	supply	shock.	In	the	high	inflation	targeting	regime	the	central	bank	reacts	by	lowering	the	interest	rate	thereby	fueling	the	supply	shock.	In	the	low	inflation	targeting	regime	the	central	bank	is	constrained	by	the	ZLB	 and	 is	 prevented	 from	 fueling	 the	 supply	 shock	 by	 an	 expansionary	monetary	policy.	The	two	inflation	target	regimes	also	differ	in	the	speed	with	which	the	system	returns	to	the	steady	state.	 In	the	high	inflation	target	regime	the	return	to	the	steady	state	is	faster	than	in	the	low	inflation	target	regime.	This	has	to	do	with	the	 fact	 that	 the	 central	 bank	 reverses	 its	 interest	 rate	 policy	 quicker	 in	 the	former	 than	 in	 the	 latter	 case.	 This	 then	 also	 has	 the	 effect	 of	 leading	 animal	spirits	out	of	their	“euphoric”	state	faster	in	the	high	inflation	as	compared	to	the	low	inflation	target	regime.	It	follows	that	in	the	high	inflation	target	regime	the	capacity	 of	 the	 central	 bank	 to	 steer	 the	 economy	 towards	 its	 steady	 state	 is	better	 than	 in	 the	 low	 inflation	 target	 regime	 when	 a	 positive	 supply	 shock	occurs.		This	is	a	similar	conclusion	as	the	one	derived	in	the	previous	section.				
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Figure	10:	Impulse	responses	to	positive	supply	shock	
	
	
	
Note:	In	regime	of	high	inflation	targeting	(4%)	positive	supply	shock	stimulates	output	more	and	creates	more	optimism	than	in	low	inflation	target	regime	(0%)		
	
5.	Credibility	of	inflation	targeting	and	the	zero	lower	bound			An	objection	to	the	idea	that	central	banks	should	adopt	a	higher	inflation	target	is	 that	 this	 would	 negatively	 affect	 their	 credibility	 (see	 e.g.	 Branch	 and	Evans(2014)).	We	analyze	this	question	of	credibility	in	this	section.	Our	model	allows	us	to	give	a	precise	definition	of	the	credibility	of	the	inflation	target.	 This	 can	 be	 defined	 by	 the	 fraction	 of	 agents	 who	 use	 the	 announced	
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inflation	target	as	their	forecast	for	future	inflation.	We	have	called	these	agents	the	 “targeters”.	 Since	 these	 agents	 use	 the	 announced	 inflation	 target	 as	 their	inflation	 forecast	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 they	 trust	 the	 central	 bank’s	 inflation	commitment.	In	contrast,	the	extrapolators	do	not	trust	the	central	bank.		We	used	this	insight	to	compute	an	index	of	inflation	credibility,	which	we	define	to	 be	 the	 fraction	 of	 “targeters”,	𝛽!"#,! 	as	 shown	 in	 equation	 (19).	 We	 then	computed	this	index	for	different	values	of	the	Taylor	output	parameter	and	the	inflation	target.	We	show	the	result	in	Figure	11.			Two	 results	 stand	 out.	 First,	 when	 the	 central	 bank	 increases	 its	 stabilization	effort	(the	Taylor	parameter	increases)	this	has	the	effect	of	first	increasing	the	inflation	 credibility	 of	 the	 central	 bank.	 When	 the	 Taylor	 output	 parameter	reaches	a	value	of	approximately	0.5	further	stabilization	efforts	lead	to	a	decline	in	 inflation	 credibility.	 This	 result	 can	 be	 given	 the	 following	 interpretation.	When	the	central	bank	starts	increasing	its	stabilization	efforts,	the	central	bank	also	 reduces	 the	 amplitude	 of	 the	 waves	 of	 optimism	 and	 pessimism	 (animal	spirits)	 thereby	stabilizing	not	only	output	but	also	 inflation.	This	 increases	 its	inflation	credibility.	When	 the	central	bank	uses	 too	much	output	 stabilization,	however,	 it	 undermines	 its	 inflation	 credibility	 and	 as	 a	 result	 the	 credibility	decreases.	Note	 that	 the	empirical	 literature	 reveals	 that	 central	banks	 tend	 to	set	 the	 Taylor	 output	 parameter	 close	 to	 0.5.	 We	 discuss	 this	 result	 in	 more	details	in	De	Grauwe	(2012).	Second,	an	increase	in	the	inflation	target	has	the	effect	of	shifting	the	credibility	lines	upwards,	i.e.	when	the	central	bank	increases	its	inflation	target	from	0%	to	4%	its	credibility	in	fighting	inflation	increases	for	all	values	of	the	Taylor	output	parameter.	 Put	 differently,	 by	 increasing	 the	 inflation	 target	 the	 central	 bank	improves	its	inflation	credibility	regardless	of	whether	the	central	bank	applies	little	 or	 much	 output	 stabilization.	 This	 result	 can	 be	 given	 the	 following	interpretation.	When	 the	 inflation	 target	 is	 set	 too	 low,	 the	 rate	 of	 inflation	 is	more	likely	to	be	pushed	into	negative	territory.	This	is	the	territory	in	which	the	central	bank	loses	its	capacity	to	influence	both	inflation	and	output	by	varying	the	 interest	rate.	As	result,	 it	will	 frequently	fail	 to	reach	its	 inflation	target.	By	raising	 the	 inflation	 target	 it	 reduces	 the	 frequency	 of	 hitting	 the	 zero	 lower	
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bound.	 As	 a	 result,	 it	 maintains	 its	 capacity	 to	 affect	 inflation	 and	 output	 by	varying	 the	 interest	 rate.	 This	 is	 illustrated	 in	 Figure	 12,	 which	 shows	 the	number	 of	 times	 (in	 simulations	 of	 1000	 periods)	 the	 ZLB	 is	 hit	 for	 different	values	of	the	Taylor	output	parameter	and	levels	of	inflation	target.	We	observe	that	raising	the	intensity	of	output	stabilization	reduces	the	number	of	times	the	ZLB	 is	 hit	 for	 all	 levels	 of	 inflation	 target.	 Similarly,	 raising	 the	 inflation	 target	reduces	 the	 frequency	 of	 hitting	 the	 ZLB	 for	 all	 values	 of	 the	 Taylor	 output	parameter.	
Figure	11:	Credibility	and	inflation	targets	
	
Note:	By	increasing	inflation	target	the	central	bank	improves	its	inflation	credibility;	output	stabilization	improves	inflation	credibility	up	to	a	point		
Figure	12:	Number	of	ZLB	periods,	stabilization	and	inflation	targets	
Note:	Raising	intensity	of	output	stabilization	and	increasing	inflation	target	reduces	frequency	of	hitting	ZLB	
	 34	
	
6.	Empirical	verification	
	In	this	section	we	provide	empirical	verification	of	some	of	the	predictions	made	by	our	behavioral	model.	We	focus	on	three	predictions.		
6.1	Excess	kurtosis	and	fat	tails	in	the	distribution	of	the	output	gap		Our	model	predicts	 that	 the	distribution	of	 the	output	gap	 is	non-normal,	 i.e.	 it	exhibits	excess	kurtosis	and	fat	tails.	The	latter	are	generated	when	the	economy	is	 gripped	 by	 extreme	 optimism	 or	 pessimism,	 leading	 to	 large	 positive	 or	negative	 movements	 in	 output.	 This	 feature	 is	 also	 what	 drives	 most	 of	 our	results.		The	existence	of	non-normality	in	the	distribution	of	the	output	gap	(and	output	 growth)	 has	 been	 confirmed	 empirically	 for	most	 OECD	 countries	 (see	Fagiolo,	et	al.,	(2008),	Fagiolo,	et	al.,	(2009),	De	Grauwe	and	Ji(2016)).	Ascari	et	al.(2015)	find	that	RBC	and	NK	models	cannot	generate	the	fat	tails	observed	in	the	data	(which	our	paper	can).		One	could	object	to	this	empirical	evidence	that	the	large	shocks	observed	in	the	output	 gaps	 can	 also	 be	 the	 result	 of	 large	 exogenous	 shocks	 (see	 Fernandez-Villaverde	 and	Rubio-Ramirez(2007)	 and	 Justiniano	 and	Primiceri(2008)).	 The	claim	that	is	made	here	is	not	that	the	economy	cannot	sometimes	be	hit	by	large	shocks	(it	often	is),	but	that	a	theory	that	can	explain	large	movements	in	output	gaps	 only	 as	 a	 result	 of	 large	 exogenous	 shocks	 is	 an	 incomplete	 one.	 	 This	creates	an	opening	for	a	theory	like	ours	that	can	explain	large	movements	in	the	output	gap	(fat	tails)	endogenously.		
6.2	Two-way	causality	between	animal	spirits	and	output	gap		In	our	theoretical	model,	there	exists	a	two-way	causality	between	animal	spirits	and	 the	 output	 gap,	 i.e.	 positive	 (negative)	 animal	 spirits	 produce	 a	 positive	(negative)	 output	 gap;	 conversely,	 a	 positive	 (negative)	 output	 gap	 leads	 to	positive	(negative)	animal	spirits.	This	is	in	fact	a	key	feature	of	our	theoretical	model,	 which	 produces	 a	 self-reinforcing	mechanism	 that	 leads	 to	 booms	 and	busts,	characterized	by	extreme	optimism	and	pessimism.		
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We	 illustrate	 this	 feature	 in	Table	3.	We	applied	Granger	causality	 tests	on	our	simulated	 output	 gap	 (Y)	 and	 animal	 spirits	 (ANSPIRITS)	 obtained	 from	simulating	our	 theoretical	model.	We	 find	 that	we	cannot	reject	 the	hypothesis	that	in	our	model	the	output	gap	Granger	causes	animal	spirits	and	vice	versa.		 Table	3:	Pairwise	Granger	Causality	Tests	(inflation	target	4%)			 Lag1	(observation	=1998)	 Lag2(observation	=1997)		Null	Hypothesis:	 F-Statistic	 Prob.	 F-Statistic	 Prob.		Y	does	not	Granger	Cause	ANSPIRITS	 681.507	 0.0000	 162.508	 0.0000		ANSPIRITS	does	not	Granger	Cause	Y	 134.629	 0.0000	 50.0886	 0.0000	
Note:	Granger	causality	test	applied	to	simulated	output	gap	and	animal	spirits	In	 order	 to	 test	 this	 two-way	 causality	 between	 animal	 spirits	 and	 the	 output	gap,	we	have	 to	 find	an	empirical	 counterpart	of	 animal	 spirits.	We	decided	 to	use	the	business	confidence	index	(BCI)	as	produced	by	the	OECD	as	an	indicator	for	the	animal	spirits.	The	BCI	is	based	on	enterprises'	assessment	of	production,	orders	 and	 stocks,	 as	 well	 as	 its	 current	 position	 and	 expectations	 for	 the	immediate	 future.	 	 This	 is	 very	 similar	 to	 what	 our	 index	 of	 animal	 spirits	 St	measures.	As	will	be	remembered,	when	St	is	positive	it	means	that	the	fraction	of	agents	with	a	positive	outlook	about	the	future	output	gap	is	 larger	than	the	fraction	 of	 agents	with	 a	 negative	 outlook.	 This	 is	 also	what	 the	BCI	measures	when	 it	 questions	 participants	 about	 their	 sentiments	 (forecasts)	 about	 future	business	conditions.			The	 BCI	 has	 been	 rescaled	 to	 yield	 a	 long-term	 average	 of	 100.	 The	more	 the	index	 exceeds	 100,	 the	more	 optimistic	 (positive	 animal	 spirits)	 it	 shows.	 The	more	 the	 index	 is	 below	100,	 the	more	 pessimistic	 (negative	 animal	 spirits)	 it	shows.	We	 performed	Granger	 causality	 tests	 between	 the	BCI	 and	 the	 output	gap	 for	 the	Eurozone	and	 for	 the	US	during	 the	period	1999-2015.	The	 results	are	shown	in	Table	4.				
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Table	4:	Granger	causality	tests	Business	Confidence	Index	(BCI)	and	output	gap	(Sample	period:	1999Q1-	2015Q4)	
 
		 		 Lag=1	(obs=71)	 Lag=2	(obs=70)	
	 Null	Hypothesis	 F	test	 Prob.	 F	test	 Prob.	U.S.	 Output	gap	does	not	granger	cause	BCI	 6.4923	 0.0131	 11.542	 0.0011		 BCI	does	not	granger	cause	output	gap	 23.113	 0	 23.683	 0	Eurozone	 Output	gap	does	not	granger	cause	BCI	 6.9791	 0.0102	 6.4346	 0.0135			 BCI	does	not	granger	cause	output	gap	 25.51	 0	 12.148	 0.0009	Note:	the	Dickey–Fuller	tests	reject	unit	root	in	BCI	and	output	gap	Data	resources:	BCI	is	from	OECD,	output	gap	is	from	oxford	economics.	Data	frequency:	quarterly.	The	BCI	quarterly	data	is	averaged	from	monthly	data.	
 We	find	that	we	cannot	reject	the	hypothesis	of	a	two-way	causality	between	the	output	gap	and	the	indicators	of	business	confidence	(BCI)	in	the	Eurozone	and	the	US.	This	confirms	one	of	the	key	predictions	of	our	model,	i.e.	the	dynamics	of	booms	and	busts	is	characterized	by	a	process	by	which	waves	of	optimism	and	pessimism	drive	the	business	cycle,	while	the	latter	also	influences	optimism	and	pessimism.	
 
6.3	Probabilities	of	hitting	the	ZLB	We	noted	in	the	introduction	that	standard	linear	DSGE	models	have	tended	to	underestimate	the	probability	of	hitting	the	ZLB	as	was	shown	by	Chung,	et	al.,	(2012).	Most	 of	 these	models	 have	 led	 to	 the	prediction	 that	when	 the	 central	bank	keeps	 an	 inflation	 target	of	2%,	 it	 is	 very	unlikely	 for	 the	 economy	 to	be	pushed	 into	 the	 ZLB	 (Reifschneider	 and	 Williams	 (1999),	 Coenen(2003),	Schmitt-Grohe	 and		 Uribe(2007)	 ).	 Reifschneider	 and	Williams(1999)	 came	 to	the	 conclusion	 that	 “if	 monetary	 policy	 followed	 the	 prescriptions	 of	 the	standard	Taylor	rule	with	an	inflation	target	of	2	percent,	the	federal	funds	rate	would	 be	 near	 zero	 about	 5	 percent	 of	 the	 time	 (p.1).	 Our	 model	 came	 to	 a	prediction	 that	when	 central	banks	 set	 an	 inflation	 target	of	2%	and	using	 the	same	Taylor	 rule,	 the	 probability	 of	 hitting	 the	 ZLB	 is	much	 higher	 and	 in	 the	order	of	20	to	30%.		It	is	not	easy	to	verify	these	different	predictions	empirically.	But	we	have	some	suggestive	evidence	from	the	period	since	central	banks	switched	to	an	inflation	
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target	 of	 2%.	 In	 the	 Eurozone	 countries	 this	 happened	 in	 1999	 when	 the	European	 monetary	 union	 was	 started.	 The	 ECB	 then	 announced	 an	 inflation	target	of	2%.	In	the	US	an	explicit	inflation	target	of	2%	was	only	introduced	in	2012	by	 the	 then	Chairman	 of	 the	 Federal	 Reserve,	 Bern	Bernanke.	 It	 is	 clear,	however,	that	the	Federal	Reserve	pursued	an	implicit	inflation	target	of	close	to	2%	from	the	end	of	the	1990s.		In	Figure	13	we	show	the	policy	rates	in	the	US	and	the	Eurozone	since	1999.	We	observe	that	these	rates	were	close	to	zero	for	a	considerable	time.	In	fact	the	US	policy	rate	was	close	to	zero	45%	of	the	time,	in	the	Eurozone	this	was	41%.	This	is	even	higher	than	the	prediction	of	our	model.	This	 is	probably	related	to	the	fact	 that	 the	 recession	 of	 2008-09	was	 deeper	 and	 longer-lasting	 than	 normal	recessions	as	it	followed	a	financial	crisis	(see	Reinhart	and	Rogoff(2009)).	
 
 Source:	ECB,	Statistical	Warehouse	and	Board	of	Governors	of	the	US	Federal	Reserve	System			In	Figure	14,	we	also	 show	 the	policy	 rates	of	 other	major	 central	banks	 since	1999.	 These	 are	 the	 central	 banks	 of	 Switzerland,	 Sweden,	 the	 UK,	 Canada,	Norway,	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand.	 In	 Table	 5,	 we	 show	 the	 probabilities	 of	hitting	 the	 ZLB	 in	 Canada,	 Norway,	 Australia	 New	 Zealand,	 Switzerland	 and	Sweden.	 We	 obtained	 these	 probabilities	 by	 counting	 the	 number	 of	 months	these	 countries	 were	 hitting	 the	 ZLB	 over	 the	 total	 number	 of	 months	 (216).	Note	that	in	the	case	of	the	UK	the	interest	rate	was	kept	constant	at	the	level	of	
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0.5%	from	2009	to	2016.	The	Bank	of	England	seems	to	have	considered	0.5%	to	be	an	effective	ZLB.		A	 factor	 that	 leads	 to	 the	observed	difference	 in	 the	probabilities	of	hitting	 the	ZLB		may	be	related	to	the	level	of	the	inflation	target	of	a	central	bank.	As	shown	in	Table	5,	Switzerland,	Sweden	and	the	UK	have	a	relatively	low	inflation	target	(about	2%)	while	Canada,	Norway,	Australia	and	New	Zealand	have	an	inflation	target	which	can	 reach	3%.	This	also	confirms	 the	prediction	of	our	model,	 i.e.	that	countries	using	a	higher	inflation	target	are	less	likely	to	hit	the	ZLB2.		Clearly	 this	 can	 only	 be	 considered	 as	 preliminary	 evidence.	 These	 countries	differ	among	many	other	dimensions	(e.g.	the	severity	of	the	recession	of	2008-9,	intensity	 of	 banking	 crisis)	 that	 can	 affect	 interest	 rate	 movements	 and	 the	probabilities	of	hitting	the	ZLB.	More	empirical	analysis	is	called	for.			
		 																																																									
2 Note that Figure 6 (page 22) predicts that countries with an inflation target of 4% will hit the ZLB 
10% of the time. We find here (table 5) that some countries with an inflation target below 4% spend 
0% of the time in the ZLB. It should be mentioned here that the results of Figure 6 are based on 
simulations of 10,000 periods (quarters). During such long periods we find that the interest rates 
regularly stay away from the ZLB during spells extending to hundred periods.  
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Table	5.	Probability	of	hitting	ZLB	and	Inflation	Target				 Inflation	target	 Probability	of	Hitting	ZLB	US	 1.7-2%	 45%	Eurozone	 below	but	close	to	2%	 41%	Switzerland	 <2%	 30%	Sweden	 2%	 11%	UK	 2%	 2%	Canada	 1-3%	 6%	Norway	 2.50%	 0%	Australia	 2-3%	 0%	New	Zealand	 1-3%	 0%	Sources:	Inflation	target	rates	are	obtained	from	official	websites	of	the	central	banks.	The	interest	rates	are	obtained	from	IMF	data	and	the	probabilities	of	hitting	ZLB	are	from	authors’	own	calculation.		
	
6.4	Forecasting	errors		In	this	section	we	compare	the	mean	forecasting	errors	made	by	fundamentalists	and	 extrapolators	 in	 our	 model	 with	 real-life	 forecasting	 errors	 made	 by	professional	 forecasters.	 For	 the	 latter	 we	 use	 the	 Survey	 of	 Professional	Forecasters	 (SPF)	 collected	 by	 the	 ECB.	 We	 compare	 standard	 measures	 of	forecast	 errors,	 i.e.	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 forecast	 errors	 (STDE),	 the	mean	absolute	 forecast	 error	 (MAE)	and	 the	 root	mean	 squared	 forecast	 error	(RMSE).	We	use	 a	 study	made	 by	 the	 ECB	 for	 the	 Eurozone	 during	 the	 period	1999-2006,	and	we	compare	these	measures	with	those	obtained	in	our	model.	We	compute	these	measures	of	forecast	errors	in	our	model	during	lengths	of	8	years	(32	quarters).	We	repeat	this	100	times	and	take	an	average.			We	show	the	results	in	table	6.	We	find	that	the	MAE	and	RMSE	are	slightly	lower	in	our	model	than	in	the	empirical	data	of	the	Eurozone.	The	reverse	is	true	for	STDE.	Both	in	our	model	 and	 in	 the	 empirical	 data	 the	 forecast	 errors	 relating	 to	 output	 gap	(GDP	growth)	are	significantly	 larger	than	the	 forecast	errors	 in	 inflation.	Thus	our	model	mimicks	an	important	feature	of	real-life	forecast	errors.					
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	Table	 6:	 Measures	 of	 forecast	 errors	 in	 the	 behavioral	 model	 and	 in	 the	Eurozone	using	the	SPF	
		 		 Behavioral	model	 Eurozone	
		 		 		 		
															Output	 		 		
		 MAE	 0.81	 0.9	
		 		 		 		
		 RMSE	 0.95	 1.0	
		 		 		 		
		 STDE	 0.97	 0.59	
		 		 		 		
													Inflation	 		 		
		 MAE	 0.39	 0.5	
		 		 		 		
		 RMSE	 0.45	 0.6	
		 		 		 		
		 STDE	 0.47	 0.38	
		 		 		 		Source:	Eurozone	data	are	from	Bowles,	et	al.(2007).		The	output	forecast	errors	relate	to	the	growth	rate	of	GDP	(not	the	output	gap)	Note:	 The	 forecast	 errors	 relate	 to	 one-year	 ahead	 forecasts.	 I	 our	model	 this	means	that	we	take	forecasts	four-quarters	ahead.				
7.	Conclusion	In	 this	 paper	we	 have	 analyzed	 the	 relation	 between	 the	 level	 of	 the	 inflation	target	 and	 the	 ZLB	 constraint	 imposed	 on	 the	 nominal	 interest	 rate.	 	 We	analyzed	this	relation	in	the	framework	of	a	behavioral	macroeconomic	model	in	which	 agents	 experience	 cognitive	 limitations,	 preventing	 them	 from	 forming	rational	expectations.	This	forces	them	to	use	simple	rules	of	thumb	to	forecast	the	output	gap	and	the	rate	of	inflation.	Rationality	is	introduced	into	the	model	by	 allowing	 agents	 to	 learn	 from	 their	 mistakes	 and	 to	 switch	 to	 the	 better	performing	 forecasting	 rules.	 The	 model	 produces	 endogenous	 waves	 of	optimism	 and	 pessimism	 (animal	 spirits)	 that,	 because	 of	 their	 self-fulfilling	nature,	drive	the	business	cycle	and	in	turn	are	influenced	by	the	business	cycle.	The	use	of	this	behavioral	model	has	allowed	us	to	shed	new	light	on	the	optimal	level	 of	 the	 inflation	 target	 in	 a	world	where	 a	 ZLB	 constraint	 on	 the	 nominal	interest	rate	exists.	We	found	that	when	the	inflation	target	is	too	close	to	zero,	the	economy	can	get	gripped	by	“chronic	pessimism”	that	leads	to	a	dominance	of	negative	output	gaps	and	recessions,	and	 in	 turn	 feeds	back	on	expectations	
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producing	long	waves	of	pessimism.	The	mechanism	that	produces	this	chronic	pessimism	can	be	described	as	follows.	Endogenous	movements	in	animal	spirits	regularly	 produce	 recessions	 and	 negative	 inflation	 rates.	When	 that	 happens,	the	central	bank	cannot	use	 its	 interest	rate	 to	boost	 the	economy	and	to	raise	inflation	 as	 the	 nominal	 interest	 rate	 cannot	 become	 negative.	When	 inflation	becomes	negative	this	also	implies	that	the	real	interest	rate	increases	during	the	recession,	aggravating	the	latter,	and	increasing	pessimism.	The	economy	can	get	stuck	for	a	very	long	time	in	this	cycle	of	pessimism	and	negative	output	gap.		Thus,	 when	 the	 inflation	 target	 is	 set	 too	 close	 to	 zero	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	output	gap	is	skewed	towards	the	negative	territory.	The	question	then	is	what	“too	 close	 to	 zero”	 means.	 The	 simulations	 of	 our	 model,	 using	 parameter	calibrations	 that	 are	 generally	 found	 in	 the	 literature,	 suggests	 that	 2%	 is	 too	low,	 i.e.	 produces	 negative	 skewness	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 the	 output	 gap.	We	find	that	an	inflation	target	in	the	range	of	3%	to	4%	comes	closer	to	producing	a	symmetric	distribution	of	the	output	gap.		We	also	found	that	when	the	economy	is	pushed	into	a	recession	as	a	result	of	a	negative	 demand	 shock,	 the	 high	 inflation	 target	 regime	 has	 better	 stabilizing	properties.	We	 found	that	 in	 the	high	 inflation	 target	regime	the	persistence	of	the	recession	is	shorter	than	in	the	low	inflation	target	regime.	That	is,	when	the	central	bank	sets	a	relatively	high	inflation	target,	the	capacity	of	the	system	to	lift	itself	out	of	the	recession	is	stronger	than	when	it	sets	a	low	inflation	target.	This	 is	made	possible	by	 the	stabilizing	properties	of	monetary	policies	and	by	the	ensuing	elimination	of	self-fulfilling	pessimism.		Another	 major	 finding	 of	 our	 analysis	 is	 that	 with	 an	 inflation	 target	 of	 2%	(which	has	become	the	standard	in	inflation	targeting)	the	economy	hits	the	ZLB	with	a	probability	of	25%	compared	to	less	than	10%	with	an	inflation	target	of	4%.	These	are	significantly	higher	probabilities	than	those	obtained	in	standard	DSGE	 models.	 The	 reason	 we	 find	 significantly	 higher	 probabilities	 has	 to	 do		with	the		fact	that	animal	spirits	amplify	shocks	and		in	combination	with	the	ZLB	can	keep	the	economy	in	a	persistent	way	into	negative	territory.					The	previous	results	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	central	banks	should	raise	the	inflation	target	from	2%	to	a	range	between	3%	to	4%	(see	also	Blanchard,	et	al.	
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(2010)	and	Ball(2014)	on	this).	One	might	object	here	that	this	conclusion	does	not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 potential	 negative	 effect	 on	 inflation	 credibility	 of	raising	 the	 inflation	 target	 to	 3%	 or	 4%.	 We	 analyzed	 this	 question	 in	 the	framework	 of	 our	 behavioral	 model.	 Our	 model	 gives	 a	 precise	 definition	 of	credibility,	 as	 the	 fraction	 of	 agents	 that	 use	 the	 announced	 inflation	 target	 as	their	rule	of	thumb	to	forecast	inflation.	It	turns	out	that	an	inflation	target	of	3%	or	4%	has	more	credibility	than	a	target	of	2%.	The	reason	has	to	do	with	what	we	said	earlier.	With	an	 inflation	 target	of	2%	the	output	gap	and	 inflation	are	more	often	pushed	into	negative	territory	than	when	the	inflation	target	is	3%	or	4%.	Once	inflation	and	output	gap	are	in	the	negative	territory	the	power	of	the	central	bank	to	affect	the	output	gap	and	inflation	is	weakened.	As	a	result,	 the	observed	inflation	rate	will	deviate	more	often	from	the	target,	when	the	target	is		low,	thereby	undermining	the	credibility	of	the	central	bank.		One	 issue	that	we	have	not	analysed	 in	 this	paper	 is	how	periods	of	prolonged	pessimism	that	are	produced	by	an	inflation	target	that	is	set	too	low	affects	long	term	growth.	 It	 is	not	unreasonable	to	believe	that	“chronic	pessimism”	 lowers	investment	in	a	persistent	way	thereby	lowering	long-term	growth.	As	we	have	not	 incorporated	 these	 long-term	 growth	 effects	 in	 our	model,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	come	to	precise	conclusions.	We	leave	this	issue	for	further	research.		 	
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APPENDIX	A:	Forecasting	rules	are	AR(1)	In	this	appendix	we	show	some	results	when	we	impose	an	AR(1)	structure	on	the	 forecasting	 rules.	 This	 does	 not	 affect	 our	 main	 results.	 We	 show	 typical	simulations	 in	 the	 time	 domain	 (using	 the	 same	 parameter	 values	 and	distribution	of	the	shocks	as	in	the	main	text).		We	obtain	some	more	persistence	in	the	business	cycles.			Figure	A1:	Output	gap	in	frequency	and	time	domains	(different	inflation	targets)		 Inflation	target	=	2%		
	Skewness=-0.32	ZLB=41%		 Inflation	target	=0%	
	 		skewness=-0.72	ZLB=	63%					 	
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APPENDIX	B:	Relative	performance	of	forecasting	rules	and	their	use	In	this	appendix	we	present	the	relative	performance	of	the	extrapolative	versus	the	fundamentalist	 forecasting	rules	(Figure	A2).	This	 is	obtained	by	taking	the	difference	 in	 the	 utilities	 of	 the	 extrapolative	 and	 the	 fundamentalist	 rule.	 	 In	Figures	A3	and	A4	we	show	the	fractions	of	the	agents	use	the	extrapolative	resp.	the	fundamentalist	rules.		Figure	A2	
	Figure	A3	
	Figure	A4	
	Correlation	relative	performance	and	fraction	extrapolators=0.78				 	
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APPENDIX	C:	Choosing	the	standard	deviations	of	shocks		In	 this	 appendix	 we	 describe	 how	we	 selected	 the	 standard	 deviations	 in	 the	error	terms.	We	first	collected	empirical	data	on	the	standard	deviations	of	the	output	gap	and	 inflation	 in	 the	US	and	 the	Eurozone.	These	are	shown	 in	 table	C1.		
Table	C1:			Standard	deviations	of	output	gap	and	inflation	(quarterly	observations)	
		 Output	gap	 Inflation	
	
U.S.	 Eurozone	 U.S.	 Eurozone	
Sample	period:	2000-2016	 1,6	 1,7	 1,3	 1,0	
Sample	period:	1990-2016	 1,7	 --	 1,3	 --	
Source:	 Author’s	 own	 calculations	 using	 output	 gap	 from	 Oxford	 Economics	 and	 inflation	
from	the	US	Bureau	of	Labor	Statistics	and	Eurostat.	
		We	then	simulated	our	model	for	different	standard	deviations	of	the	exogenous	shocks	 in	 inflation	 (while	 keeping	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 output	 shocks	constant)	and	computed	the	standard	deviations	of	the	simulated	output	gap	and	inflation.	 We	 did	 this	 consecutively	 for	 increasing	 standard	 deviations	 of	 the	output	shocks.	We	assumed	an	inflation	target	of	2%.	The	results	are	shown	in	Figure	C1.	 This	 shows	 the	 standard	deviation	 of	 the	 simulated	 output	 gap	 and	inflation	 for	 different	 standard	 deviations	 in	 the	 inflation	 shocks	 (and	 for	 a	standard	 deviation	 of	 the	 output	 gap	 equal	 to	 0.5).	 We	 observe	 that	 with	 a	standard	deviation	of	 the	shocks	 in	 inflation	and	of	output	gap	of	0.5	we	come	very	close	to	the	empirically	observed	standard	deviations	of	the	output	gap	and	inflation.	 It	 is	 also	 interesting	 to	 observe	 that	 while	 we	 assume	 the	 same	standard	deviation	 in	 the	 shocks	of	 output	 and	 inflation	 the	model	 produces	 a	significantly	higher	standard	deviation	of	the	output	gap	than	of	inflation.	This	is	also	confirmed	empirically.	Thus,	we	do	not	need	to	assume	that	the	exogenous	shocks	in	the	output	gap	are	higher	than	the	shocks	in	inflation	to	produce	this	result.		
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Figure	C1:	
	
	
	
 
 
Appendix D: The relation between animal spirits and forecast errors 
	
In this appendix we show how animal spirits and the forecast errors made by chartists 
and fundamentalists are related3. In order to do so, we make the simplifying 
assumption that the true dynamics of a particular variable (output gap or inflation) is 
given by: 
 𝑦!!! = 0.5𝑦!	 	 	 		 	 (1)		Fundamentalists	 and	 chartists	 make	 forecasts	 in	 period	 t	 about	𝑦!!!,	 i.e.	 the	output	gap	or	inflation	that	will	prevail	in	t+1.	The	mean	forecast	error	that	will	be	made	in	period	t+1	is	therefore	given	by		 𝑒!!! = 𝛼!,!𝑒!!!! + 𝛼!,!𝑒!!!! 	 	 	 (2)		Note	that	we	multiply	the	forecast	errors	made	by	fundamentalists	and	chartists	in	period	t+1	by	the	fractions	of	 fundamentalists	and	chartists	 in	period	t	since	this	is	the	period	when	these	forecasts	were	made.		If	𝑦! = 1 > 0,	yt+1	=	0.5			
• Fundamentalists’	forecast	error	in	t+1	is	𝑒!!!! = 0.5− 0 = 0.5	
• Extrapolators’	forecast	error	in	t+1	is		𝑒!!!! = 0.5− 1 = −0.5		As	a	result	the	mean	forecast	error	in	t+1	becomes																																																									
3 We are grateful to a referee for proposing this analysis  
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	 𝑒!!! = 𝛼!,!𝑒!!!! + 𝛼!,!𝑒!!!! = 0.5(𝛼!,! − 𝛼!,!)		This	implies	that		 𝑆! = −2𝑒!!!		In	other	words	animal	spirits	 in	period	t	are	correlated	with	the	mean	forecast	errors	 in	 period	 t+1.	 An	 alternative	 way	 to	 put	 this	 is	 that	 the	mean	 forecast	errors	today	are	correlated	with	the	animal	spirits	that	prevailed	in	the	previous	period.			 𝑒! = −0.5𝑆!!!	
	A	similar	argument	can	be	developed	when	𝑦! = −1 > 0,		so	that	yt+1	=	-0.5			In	that	case	we	find			 𝑒!!! = 𝛼!,!𝑒!!!! + 𝛼!,!𝑒!!!! = −0.5(𝛼!,! − 𝛼!,!)	
	
so that  
	 𝑆! = −2𝑒!!!	
	Simulating	the	model	over	10,000	periods	we	find	a	correlation	between	𝑆!	and	𝑒!!!	of		-0.23	 	
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